This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2011-10-12 |
SERENO, J. |
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| As a general rule, an order granting the accused's demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:[34] | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[11] where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus: By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied] | |||||
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2010-07-26 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[30] this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus: x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[31] | |||||
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2001-02-15 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| xxxx Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and disposition they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. xxxx[14] The administrative case at bar involves an acquittal on an accused by the respondent judge in three (3) closely related criminal cases which were earlier consolidated in the court presided by respondent judge. As a rule, acquittal is immediately final and executory. Consequently, in view of the pendency in this Court (First Division) of the petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587), supra, we may not, ordinarily, review here the said judgment of acquittal in those three (3) criminal cases, the inquiry in this administrative case being limited to the issue of whether the respondent judge is liable for the charges brought against him.[15] However, to resolve those charges in the administrative case, it is indispensable that we consider the respondent Judge's subject Resolution dated March 13, 1997 granting accused Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter in the closely related Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992. | |||||
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2001-02-15 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| In appealing Wang's acquittal, the State is relying on a recognized exception to the general rule in that where the assailed judgment is void, no double jeopardy results from the re-filing of the criminal case.[16] In view of the pendency of the said appeal, we should, ordinarily, be constrained from resolving the charge of violation of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. However, in this administrative case, justice demands that we resolve the basic issue relative to the legality or illegality of Wang's warrantless arrest and search, and the issue on the admissibility of the bags of "shabu," scales and unlicensed firearms which were confiscated during the warrantless search. These are the very same issues being litigated in the said appeal.[17] Meanwhile, there is as yet no definitive pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No. 128587, supra, whether respondent's Resolution of acquittal of Wang is patently erroneous. The jurisprudential rule is that pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature.[18] | |||||
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2001-02-15 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| In appealing Wang's acquittal, the State is relying on a recognized exception to the general rule in that where the assailed judgment is void, no double jeopardy results from the re-filing of the criminal case.[16] In view of the pendency of the said appeal, we should, ordinarily, be constrained from resolving the charge of violation of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. However, in this administrative case, justice demands that we resolve the basic issue relative to the legality or illegality of Wang's warrantless arrest and search, and the issue on the admissibility of the bags of "shabu," scales and unlicensed firearms which were confiscated during the warrantless search. These are the very same issues being litigated in the said appeal.[17] Meanwhile, there is as yet no definitive pronouncement by this Court in G.R. No. 128587, supra, whether respondent's Resolution of acquittal of Wang is patently erroneous. The jurisprudential rule is that pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature.[18] | |||||