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STAMFORD MARKETING CORP. v. JOSEPHINE JULIAN

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

2007-10-19
VELASCO, JR., J.
It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;[39] (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal.[40] The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.[41] As they failed to conform to the law, the strikes on February 21, 22, and 23, 2001 were illegal.
2007-09-13
TINGA, J.
The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit an illegal act during the strike.[34] It can be gleaned from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.[35]
2006-06-30
CARPIO MORALES, J.
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike.[51]
2006-03-03
QUISUMBING, J
Here, petitioner's argument in support of its abandonment charge was that respondents may have resented its issuance of the Implementing Guidelines. This, in our view, fails to establish respondents' intention to abandon their jobs. On the contrary, by filing the complaint for illegal dismissal within two days of their dismissal on January 11, 2000 and by seeking reinstatement in their position paper, respondents manifested their intention against severing their employment relationship with petitioner and abandoning their jobs. It is settled that an employee who forthwith protests his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work.[26]
2005-10-25
CARPIO, J.
We agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that RAMATEK illegally dismissed Anelia. This Court defers to the factual findings of labor officials, who possess the expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, provided substantial evidence support such factual findings.[19] Thus, absent any proof that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are capricious or arbitrary, such findings have conclusive effect on this Court and deserve finality.[20]
2005-06-15
GARCIA, J.
Likewise, in Stamford Marketing Corporation, et al. vs. Julian, et al.,[8] we held:For the same reasons, we likewise affirm the Court of Appeals in upholding the findings of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter regarding the validity or invalidity of quitclaims and the award of other monetary claims. Questions on whether the quitclaims were voluntarily executed or not are factual in nature. Thus, petitioners' appeal for us to re-examine certain pieces of documentary evidence concerning monetary claims cannot now be entertained. Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence. It is not our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the Arbiter and the Court of Appeals coincide. (Underscoring supplied)
2005-04-15
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
This petition mainly involves factual issues, i.e., whether or not there is evidence on record to support the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that respondent is entitled to the payment of salary differential and unpaid wages.  This calls for a re-examination of the evidence, which the Court cannot entertain.  As stated earlier, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.  It is not the Court's function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the Arbiter and the Court of Appeals concur.[8]