This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-02-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Petitioners' contention may be accorded some measure of plausibility, except for the fact that it ignores a basic legal principle: that the power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an executive prerogative,[43] albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their respective territorial jurisdiction.[44] Reclassification decrees issued by the executive department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD 27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Sec. 3(2), Art. XVII of the 1973 Constitution provides that: [A]ll proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or unless expressly or impliedly modified or repealed by the regular Batasang Pambansa. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[69] this Court declared that: The filing of a notice of appeal is no idle ceremony. Its office is to elevate the case on appeal to DARAB without which appellate jurisdiction is not conferred. Neither PARAD nor DARAB is permitted to enlarge the constricted manner by which an appeal is perfected. Liberal construction of DARAB rules is unavailable to produce the effect of a perfected appeal. | |||||
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2008-10-06 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| Contrary to what petitioners think, the Natalia ruling was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite reservations. It is also applicable to other agricultural lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL. This is subject to the condition that the conversion was made with the approval of government agencies like the HLURB.[36] | |||||
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2007-08-17 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Even assuming, arguendo, that certiorari may lie, the Court still cannot grant the instant petition because it violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. The choice of where to file the petition for certiorari is not left to the party seeking the writ.[23] The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.[24] This Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only when absolutely necessary, or where serious and important reasons therefor exist.[25] | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority, has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance.[24] | |||||
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2005-08-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v. Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]). | |||||