This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-02-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,[22] We held: After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, | |||||
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2013-04-10 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.[23] In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,[24] it was held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved. | |||||
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2010-02-04 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretary's Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Merelos's authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents.[11] Considering that petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities.[12] | |||||
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2009-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.[14] | |||||
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2009-09-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The Court further agrees in the deletion by the Court of Appeals of the award for actual damages made by the RTC. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.[40] Here, only the bare and self-serving testimonies of respondents' witnesses support the claim for actual damages. The Court cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on competent proof that the claimant has suffered, and an evidence of, the actual amount thereof.[41] | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,[50] otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.[51] In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.[52] It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. | |||||