This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2010-06-23 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| 4. Without fault or intention of causing it.[27] | |||||
|
2009-07-03 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground - i.e., exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 - that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense's claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, [22] no essential change is really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts' conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did not raise.[23] By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.[24] It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition. | |||||
|
2009-06-05 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or defense of a relative is effectively a change of theory of the case brought only during appeal. We cannot allow this move. Law and fairness to the adverse party demand that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is tried and decided on the basis of that theory in the court below, neither party can change his or her theory on appeal.[22] While this rule is not absolute, no exceptional reasons in this case exist to justify a deviation.[23] | |||||
|
2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[63] Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[64] There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury.[65] | |||||
|
2008-08-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| It is well-settled that unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action.[15] It is a condition sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[16] Thus, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[17] | |||||
|
2007-06-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| "Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence.[21] The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are: A person is performing a lawful act; | |||||
|
2006-07-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person.[33] A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression,[34] unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.[35] There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant's life in real peril.[36] | |||||
|
2005-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| In the first place, the petitioner insisted in its pleadings in the court a quo that under the Supplementary Lease Agreement and Contract of Lease, it was granted the exclusive option to purchase the property leased. The petitioner maintained its theory of the case in the CA. The petitioner cannot change its theory, and claim this time that it and Carmen Cruz entered into a promise to buy and sell the property leased.[53] | |||||