This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2013-01-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections[43] (2003). | |||||
|
2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor - the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said: This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people's freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14] | |||||
|
2008-11-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,[17] which involved a similar question, this Court held that where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. | |||||
|
2007-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| In Latasa v. Comelec,[7] the Court explained the reason for the maximum term limit, thus:The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the deliberations: | |||||
|
2007-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| It is my view which is shared by the Solicitor General in Lonzanida[9] that the service of the official for the greater part of the term should be considered as "service of a term" under Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b), Chapter 1 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Those who occupy an elective position to which they have been proclaimed and have served for more than two (2) years are deemed to have fully served the term in contemplation of the three (3)-term rule regardless of whether the proclamation is subsequently voided or s/he is subsequently disqualified. | |||||