This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2008-11-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| So too did the Court pronounce in Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission,[68] Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company,[69] Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission,[70] Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission,[71] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Tolentino,[72] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[73] Permex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[74] VH Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[75] A' Prime Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[76] and St. Michael's Institute v. Santos.[77] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. However, the rule is not without exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion is based are not supported by substantial evidence.[28] Another exception is when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence.[29] Moreover, when the findings of the LA and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the CA, as in the instant case, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.[30] The Court finds that the present case falls under the above-mentioned exceptions. | |||||
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2007-06-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In labor-management relations, there can be no higher penalty than dismissal from employment. For it severs employment ties and could well be the economic death sentence of an employee. Dismissal prejudices the socio-economic well-being of the employee's family and threatens the industrial peace. Due to its far-reaching implications, the Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes. The overly concern of our laws for the welfare of employees is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitution.[21] Indeed, the employer's inherent right to discipline is subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.[22] | |||||
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2005-06-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal does not entail proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. However, the evidence must be substantial and must establish clearly and convincingly the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee rests.[18] To be a valid reason for dismissal, loss of confidence must be genuine. Uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suffice,[19] otherwise it will jeopardize the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of the employee. | |||||
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2005-05-09 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In particular, we find also that petitioners violated respondent's right to a hearing. It is well settled that if the employee denies the charges against him, a hearing is necessary to thresh out any doubt.[29] The records of the case show that respondent submitted his explanation denying that he stole beer from the company dispenser,[30] but he was not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to confront his accusers and defend himself against the charge of theft. The termination letter was issued by co-petitioner Solsoloy on December 15, 1997, one day before respondent went to the HRD Office for the alleged investigation. Clearly then, the decision to terminate respondent which was made effective on December 19, 1997, was already final, even before respondent could present his side and refute the charges against him. Indeed, at that point, nothing that respondent could say or do would have changed the decision to dismiss him. Such failure by petitioners to give respondent the benefit of a hearing and an investigation before his termination, in our view, constitutes an infringement of respondent's constitutional right to due process.[31] | |||||