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ESTATE OF POSEDIO ORTEGA v. CA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 198388 2014-07-28	JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG v. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES SERENO, C.J.
Petitioner argues that respondents are now estopped from claiming that the seafarer did not contract the illness on board the vessel, as he was presumably fit by virtue of the PEME. Anent this contention, this Court has already settled that the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof that the seafarer was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.[28] The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. It merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service"; it does not state the real state of health of an applicant.[29] Thus, we held in NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC[30] as follows: While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.
	GR No. 188595 2013-08-28	SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES v. NENITA P. SALAZAR SERENO, C.J.
In compensation proceedings for seafarers, this Court refers to the provisions of the POEA Contract as it memorializes the minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant obligations of an employer.[27] Section 20(A) thereof pertinently discusses the rules on granting death benefits. Nevertheless, on account of the liberal interpretation permeating seafarer's agreements,[28] we also consider the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer under Section 32-A of the POEA Contract.
	GR No. 175491 2012-12-10	CREW v. JINA T. SORIA MENDOZA, J.
While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on conjectures and probabilities. When there is no evidence on record to permit compensability, the Court has no choice but to deny the claim, lest injustice is caused to the employer.[33]
	GR No. 191563 2012-06-20	LEGAL HEIRS OF LATE EDWIN B. DEAUNA v. FIL-STAR MARITIME CORPORATION REYES, J.
The petitioners also refute in detail the applicability of the doctrines invoked by the respondents as the circumstances surrounding them do not obtain in the case at bar. In Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin,[21] employment was terminated upon the parties' mutual consent and the seafarer's claim was anchored on the POEA SEC and not on the provisions of a CBA. In Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[22] no evidence was offered to prove the cause of the early termination of the seafarer's contract. In Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation,[23] the seafarer was repatriated due to an eye injury but he died of cardiovascular arrest after his contract was already terminated. In Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita,[24] the seafarer was repatriated due to umbilical hernia and he died ten days after with cardiopulmonary arrest as the immediate cause, acute renal failure as the antecedent cause and hepatocellular carcinoma as the underlying cause. In Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas,[25] the seafarer was not medically repatriated. In the Estate of Posedio Ortega v. Court of Appeals,[26] the seafarer died of lung cancer and his heirs anchored their claim for death benefits on the POEA SEC, which unfortunately does not list the said illness as an occupational disease. The petitioners thus conclude that the contexts of the aforecited cases are different, hence, the doctrines enunciated therein find no application.
	GR No. 167678 2010-06-22	SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING v. FEDERICO U. NAVARRA DEL CASTILLO, J.
Thus, as we declared in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, Hermogenes v. Oseo Shipping Services, Inc., Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita, Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of Allas, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract.[16] For emphasis, we reiterate that the death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits.[17] Federico did not die while he was under the employ of petitioners. His contract of employment ceased when he arrived in the Philippines on March 30, 1998, whereas he died on April 29, 2000. Thus, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits under the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.
	GR No. 179169 2010-03-03	LEONIS NAVIGATION CO. v. CATALINO U. VILLAMATER NACHURA, J.
It is true that under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Contract, only two types of cancers are listed as occupational diseases - (1) Cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder); and (2) cancer, epithellematous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound products or residues of these substances. Section 20 of the same Contract also states that those illnesses not listed under Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. Section 20 should, however, be read together with Section 32-A on the conditions to be satisfied for an illness to be compensable,[31] to wit: For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all the following conditions must be established:
	GR No. 179177 2009-07-23	CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is also of no moment that petitioner Nisda passed his pre-employment medical examination before he was hired and deployed by respondent ADAMS as a seafarer. It has been accepted that pre-employment medical examinations are usually not exploratory in nature.[74] The same is not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. It merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service"; it does not describe the real state of health of an applicant. "While a [pre-employment medical examination] may reveal enough for the [foreign employer] to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true state of health. The [pre-employment medical examination] could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory."[75]