This case has been cited 12 times or more.
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2012-02-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioners' attack on the legality of TCT No. T-43927, issued in the name of respondents, is incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.[14] To permit a collateral attack on the title, such as what petitioners attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.[15] | |||||
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2011-06-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Time and again, we have held that cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits, not on mere technicalities. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice, as in the present case.[52] Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[53] | |||||
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2011-06-01 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said title was issued in the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose[25] and the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct proceeding contemplated by law. | |||||
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2011-01-19 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We pronounced in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[21] that: All things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's Petition based on a procedural faux pax. While a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. | |||||
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2010-08-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.[6] It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.[7] | |||||
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2010-05-06 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.[22] | |||||
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2010-04-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal. The appellate court should have been more prudent in computing the reglementary period for the filing of petitions. The CA could have been more liberal in the application of the Rules considering that, in this case, the MTCC and the RTC arrived at conflicting rulings, necessitating a thorough review of the merits of the case. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and wiser course of action for the Court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a conscientious review of the case in order to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of it on a technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases which actually results in more delay, if not in an outright miscarriage of justice.[21] | |||||
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2009-10-28 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles would be lost. The title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud."[16] It has, therefore, become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.[17] In the present case, TCT No. 96886 was registered in 1969 and respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or action to assail Joaquin Limense's title. | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.[44] The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.[45] Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.[46] | |||||
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2008-12-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43[33] of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void ; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[34] As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case. | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[32] is instructive:We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. | |||||
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2008-10-08 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities."[18] In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al.,[19] we recognized the importance of the facts and issues involved and gave due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond the reglementary period to do so, thus:We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. | |||||