This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2013-04-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Finally, we do not agree with SJO2 Almojuela's assertion that the statements of SJO2 Aquino, JO1 Loyola, SJO1 Lagahit and JO1 Robles in their affidavits should be disregarded for being hearsay as he failed to cross-examine them. It is well-settled that a formal or trial-type of hearing is not indespensible in administrative proceedings, and a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.[74] Technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always apply.[75] In Erece v. Macalingay et. al.,[76] we affirmed the CA's ruling finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service despite his contention that he had been denied his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. We held that the right to cross-examine the other party's witnesses is not an indispensable aspect of due process in administrative proceedings. Due process in these proceedings is not identical with "judicial process;" a trial in court is not always essential in administrative due process.[77] Moreover, we have consistently held that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[78] We find no reason in this case to depart from these principles. | |||||
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2013-04-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| Finally, we do not agree with SJO2 Almojuela's assertion that the statements of SJO2 Aquino, JO1 Loyola, SJO1 Lagahit and JO1 Robles in their affidavits should be disregarded for being hearsay as he failed to cross-examine them. It is well-settled that a formal or trial-type of hearing is not indespensible in administrative proceedings, and a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.[74] Technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always apply.[75] In Erece v. Macalingay et. al.,[76] we affirmed the CA's ruling finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service despite his contention that he had been denied his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. We held that the right to cross-examine the other party's witnesses is not an indispensable aspect of due process in administrative proceedings. Due process in these proceedings is not identical with "judicial process;" a trial in court is not always essential in administrative due process.[77] Moreover, we have consistently held that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[78] We find no reason in this case to depart from these principles. | |||||