This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-01-14 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Moreover, allowing Estrella to proceed with the annulment case while the collection case is still pending is like saying that she may accept the deed of sale and question it at the same time. For this is the necessary import of the two pending cases: joining as plaintiff in the collection case implies approval of the deed, while suing to declare it null and void in the annulment court entails a denunciation thereof. This may not be done. "A person cannot accept and reject the same instrument"[10] at the same time. It must be remembered that "the absence of the consent of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale."[11] | |||||
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2010-03-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void.[16] The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.[17] Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse's written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.[18] The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario's contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira's acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. | |||||
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2009-08-24 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Engaged in the business of manufacturing or importing into the Philippines Tupperware products and marketing the same under a direct selling distribution system,[3] petitioner entered into a Distributorship Agreement with respondents on March 3, 1986.[4] The agreement was to expire on March 31, 1987 but was subject to an automatic renewal clause for two one-year terms.[5] On April 1, 1991, the parties again executed another Distributorship Agreement[6] which was to expire on March 31, 1992 but renewable on a yearly basis upon terms and conditions mutually agreed upon in writing by the parties.[7] | |||||