This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-01-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.[35] (1998) and Montebon v. Commission on Elections[36] (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.[37] | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor - an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| Preventive suspension - whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] - is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6] | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Commission on Elections.[15] The respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served three consecutive terms as Municipal Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160.[16] Potencioso's assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his second term of service.[17] The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.[18] Hence, Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. | |||||