This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-01-17 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Neither is there merit to Cabalit's assertion that she should have been investigated under the "old rules of procedure" of the Office of the Ombudsman, and not under the "new rules." In Marohomsalic v. Cole,[36] we clarified that the Office of the Ombudsman has only one set of rules of procedure and that is A.O. No. 07, series of 1990, as amended. There have been various amendments made thereto but it has remained, to date, the only set of rules of procedure governing cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the phrase "as amended" is correctly appended to A.O. No. 7 every time it is invoked. A.O. No. 17 is just one example of these amendments. | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.[57] Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, includes the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others.[58] | |||||
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2009-09-03 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[14] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.[15] A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it. | |||||
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2009-06-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We will not countenance petitioner's brazen use of technicalities to defeat its legal obligation to respondent. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases[32] but they must not defeat a just claim. Moreover, petitioner cannot legally invoke a strict application of the rules of procedure because the delays were due to its own maneuvers to prolong the case. In Camacho v. CA and Dizon, et al.,[33] we held:It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. This rule of construction is [s]pecially useful in the present case where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice.[34] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.[19] | |||||
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2008-10-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse is made to the other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable.[18] If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play.[19] | |||||