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ESTHER S. PAGANO v. JUAN NAZARRO

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	AM No. P-08-2573 2012-06-19	OCA v. JAIME P. KASILAG PER CURIAM
We exercise our administrative jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilag's resignation on 1 February 2007, more than two years after he was directed to file his Comment. "The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable."[27] "Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of separation from service may no longer be imposed x x x there are other penalties which may be imposed x x x namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits."[28]
	AM No. P-10-2836 2011-09-28	OCA v. JESUS VINCENT M. CARBON III BRION, J.
Thus viewed, the respondent's flawed character and unfitness for a position in the Judiciary stand out, aggravated by his shallow scheme to escape liability by dropping out of sight to render him out of the reach of our processes. As we held in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.,[14] separation from the service renders a former employee out of the reach of the government's administrative processes with respect to the former employment, but this claim does not hold true if the separation from the service was in contemplation of and to escape administrative liability from an offense that took place and was investigated while the employee was still in the service.[15]
	GR No. 183445 2011-09-14	OFFICE OF PRESIDENT v. CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ MENDOZA, J.
Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.[48] where the Court held that: The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.[49]
	GR No. 164679 2011-07-27	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN BRION, J.
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official's resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official's resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., [40] we held that: InOffice of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726,22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the servicedoes notrender moot the administrative case against him.Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction.The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974,6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
	AM No. HOJ-10-03 2010-11-15	THELMA T. BABANTE-CAPLES v. PHILBERT B. CAPLES NACHURA, J.
The penalty of dismissal recommended by the Investigating Judge can no longer be imposed since respondent resigned from the judiciary on February 23, 2010. However, his resignation from office does not render the present administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him from liability. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.[12] Complainant filed the case before respondent resigned from office. Cessation from office because of resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service.[13]
	GR No. 189698 2010-02-22	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PUNO, C.J.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,[5] in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same rules,[6] COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., et al.,[53] we ruled that the act of filing a certificate of candidacy while one is employed in the civil service constitutes a just cause for termination of employment for appointive officials. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in considering an appointive official ipso facto resigned, merely provides for the immediate implementation of the penalty for the prohibited act of engaging in partisan political activity. Held this Court: Petitioner relies on Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code to exculpate her from an administrative charge. The aforementioned provision reads:
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,[5] filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
	AM No. 09-2-19-SC 2009-02-24	IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO v. NOGRALES PER CURIAM
Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.[251]