This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-06-27 |
BRION, J. |
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| "[T]he determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice."[19] As a rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, "[c]ourts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch";[20] the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown.[21] | |||||
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2012-06-26 |
ABAD, J. |
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| But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[14] that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.[15] | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Respondent's contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases. | |||||
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2011-10-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged.[40] He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court)[41] and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion,[42] i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.[43] | |||||
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2010-10-06 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information,[25] courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed or given due course.[26] | |||||
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2010-09-22 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."[9] On the fine points of the determination of probable cause, Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.[10] comprehensively elaborated that: The determination of [the existence or absence of probable cause] lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. Thus, the decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance or without any ground. Or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form. To emphasize, the determination of probable cause for the filing of information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case. Ultimately, whether or not a complaint will be dismissed is dependent on the sound discretion of the Secretary of Justice. And unless made with grave abuse of discretion, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review. | |||||
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2008-11-25 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,[51] the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. | |||||