Lawyerly

GR No. 173277

2015-02-25

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO

MENDOZA, J.

The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI[15] of the Constitution merely indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[16]

GR No. 154083

2013-02-27

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON DE LEON

BERSAMIN, J.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, and related cases,[29] the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Puno, has definitively recognized the full administrative disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman, declaring that its authority does not end with a recommendation to punish, but goes farther as to directly impose the appropriate sanctions on the erring public officials and employees, like removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or criminal prosecution; and characterizing such imposition of sanctions to be not merely advisory or recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit: In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[30]

GR No. 165132

2012-03-07

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO

BRION, J.

We affirmed and consistently applied this ruling in the cases of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,[41] Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[42] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[43] Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[44] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[45] Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero,[46] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[47]

GR No. 180236

2012-01-17

GEMMA P. CABALIT v. COA-REGION VII

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, [51] the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them. However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[52] this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. We held,

GR No. 172635

2010-10-20

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO

PERALTA, J.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[27] this Court settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit: We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held--

GR No. 178158

2009-12-04

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED

CARPIO, J.

[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.[21]

GR No. 177531

2009-09-10

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FATIMA A. MACUD

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Indeed, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[13] we held: It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987... It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment... However, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS. (emphasis supplied)

GR No. 179452

2009-06-11

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. LARRY M. ALFONSO

NACHURA, J.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[23] we explained that it is error to contend that R.A. No. 4670 conferred exclusive disciplinary authority on the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS, now Department of Education or DepEd) over public school teachers and to have prescribed exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.[24] Hence, it is equally erroneous for respondent to argue that the PUP Charter and R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. 4670 confer upon the BOR of PUP exclusive jurisdiction to hear disciplinary cases against university professors and personnel.

GR No. 175573

2008-09-11

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO

CORONA, J.

Moreover, the rule on intervention is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice, not to hinder or delay it.[40]

GR No. 174045

2008-03-07

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. LALINETH LISONDRA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

[W]e hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound.[21] The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.[22] (Emphasis supplied.) Of most recent vintage is Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing[23] which put to rest any uncertainty on this issue and pronounced that the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the OMB full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with constitutional deliberations. The Court held:We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja (GR No.169241 May 2, 2006 488 SCRA 574) where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." (Emphasis supplied.) In declaring that the OMB only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[24]:

	GR No. 173277 2015-02-25	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO MENDOZA, J.
The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI[15] of the Constitution merely indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[16]
	GR No. 154083 2013-02-27	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON DE LEON BERSAMIN, J.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, and related cases,[29] the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Puno, has definitively recognized the full administrative disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman, declaring that its authority does not end with a recommendation to punish, but goes farther as to directly impose the appropriate sanctions on the erring public officials and employees, like removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or criminal prosecution; and characterizing such imposition of sanctions to be not merely advisory or recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit: In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[30]
	GR No. 165132 2012-03-07	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO BRION, J.
We affirmed and consistently applied this ruling in the cases of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII,[41] Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[42] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[43] Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[44] Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[45] Office of the Ombudsman v. Lucero,[46] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[47]
	GR No. 180236 2012-01-17	GEMMA P. CABALIT v. COA-REGION VII VILLARAMA, JR., J.
One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, [51] the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose them. However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[52] this Court has already settled the issue when we ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. We held,
	GR No. 172635 2010-10-20	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO PERALTA, J.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[27] this Court settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory, to wit: We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held--
	GR No. 178158 2009-12-04	STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED CARPIO, J.
[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.[21]
	GR No. 177531 2009-09-10	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FATIMA A. MACUD LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Indeed, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[13] we held: It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987... It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment... However, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS. (emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 179452 2009-06-11	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. LARRY M. ALFONSO NACHURA, J.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[23] we explained that it is error to contend that R.A. No. 4670 conferred exclusive disciplinary authority on the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS, now Department of Education or DepEd) over public school teachers and to have prescribed exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.[24] Hence, it is equally erroneous for respondent to argue that the PUP Charter and R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. 4670 confer upon the BOR of PUP exclusive jurisdiction to hear disciplinary cases against university professors and personnel.
	GR No. 175573 2008-09-11	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO CORONA, J.
Moreover, the rule on intervention is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice, not to hinder or delay it.[40]
	GR No. 174045 2008-03-07	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. LALINETH LISONDRA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
[W]e hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound.[21] The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.[22] (Emphasis supplied.) Of most recent vintage is Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing[23] which put to rest any uncertainty on this issue and pronounced that the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the OMB full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with constitutional deliberations. The Court held:We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja (GR No.169241 May 2, 2006 488 SCRA 574) where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." (Emphasis supplied.) In declaring that the OMB only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, the appellate court mainly relied on the following statement made by the Court in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[24]:

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC