This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-06-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the others.[25] Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.[26] Hence, Inovero's liability towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained untried. | |||||
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2013-09-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the other.[57] To stress, joint tort-feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.[58] Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should be held solidarily liable to the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these circumstances except in this light. | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner Go's argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit. Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.[65] In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,[66] we held: [O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held: | |||||
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2009-06-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.[18]It may either be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.[19] A permissive counterclaim is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case. | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| For the damage caused to the respondent, petitioners and Contech are jointly liable as they are joint tort-feasors. Conformably with Article 2194, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.[29] In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,[30] the Court had the occasion to explain:[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held: | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co- plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.[16] (Emphasis supplied) In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,[17] we reiterated that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,[18] we held that:x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x | |||||