This case has been cited 11 times or more.
|
2016-01-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
||||
| [139] United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581, 591-592 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. | |||||
|
2016-01-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
||||
| An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."[62] In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed."[63] Considering that "full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation,"[64] the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial. | |||||
|
2015-09-08 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| While it is true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a correction of the public respondents' evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon, it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues in order to resolve the allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action of certiorari[63] In light of this principle, the Court reviews the following findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice in affirming the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause: Respondents are being charged for unlawful importation under Section 3601, and fraudulent practices against customs revenues under Section 3602, of the TCCP, as amended. For these charges to prosper, complainant must prove, first and foremost, that the subject articles were imported. On this score alone, complainant has miserably failed. | |||||
|
2014-03-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[14] | |||||
|
2013-09-02 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[20] Grave abuse of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."[21] The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.[22] | |||||
|
2012-01-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it stands.[42] It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause,[43] a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant. | |||||
|
2011-05-30 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| The term "probable cause" does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[42] | |||||
|
2010-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Based on the foregoing, the CA did not err in nullifying the DOJ resolutions allowing the refiling of the two estafa cases. While it is true that in reviewing the findings of the DOJ, the settled rule is that the determination of probable cause is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice.[25] For this reason, the Court leaves the DOJ ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.[26] Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch; they may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[27] In looking into the records of the case, the CA found and concluded that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in allowing the refiling of the case. We find no reason to depart from such conclusion. | |||||
|
2009-11-27 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| We clarify at the outset that what we are reviewing in this petition is the legal question of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse discretion in denying SEARBEMCO's motion to dismiss. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to the appellate court; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC ruling before it, not on the basis of whether the RTC ruling on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged RTC ruling. A court acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when its action was performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of the law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason or passion or personal hostility.[24] | |||||
|
2009-07-13 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| And it held in UCPB v. Looyuko:[14] | |||||
|
2008-07-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[24] | |||||