This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2008-06-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As to the issue of estoppel, we agree with the CA that BF is now estopped from re-impleading MIAA. While the Rules allow amendments to pleadings by leave of court, in our view, in this case, it would be an affront to the judicial process to first include a party as defendant, then voluntarily drop the party off from the complaint, only to ask that it be re-impleaded. When BF dropped MIAA as defendant in its first amended complaint, it had performed an affirmative act upon which MIAA based its subsequent actions, e.g. payments to Tokyu, on the faith that there was no cause of action against it, and so on. BF cannot now deny that it led MIAA to believe BF had no cause of action against it only to make a complete turn-about and renege on the effects of dropping MIAA as a party-defendant months after, to the prejudice of MIAA. MIAA had all reasons to rely on the CA's decision that it was no longer a party to the suit. Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is conclusive on the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.[13] A person, who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude, or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.[14] | |||||