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UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. SPS. SAMUEL AND ODETTE BELUSO

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 193346 2012-02-06	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ROGELIO AND EVELYN ROQUE REYES, J.
We agree with the trial court and the CA as to its ruling on the validity of the subject foreclosure sale. To justify its ruling, the CA cited our decision in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso,[26] where we enumerated the grounds for the proper annulment of the foreclosure sale, to wit: "(1) that there was fraud, collusion, accident, mutual mistake, breach of trust or misconduct by the purchaser; (2) that the sale had not been fairly and regularly conducted; or (3) that the price was inadequate and the inadequacy was so great as to shock the conscience of the court."[27]
	GR Nos. 173090-91 2011-09-07	UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. RODOLFO T. TIU AND VICTORIA N. TIU LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Although the Credit Line Agreement between the spouses Tiu and Union Bank was entered into on November 21, 1995,[65] when the agreement to pay in foreign currency was still considered void under Republic Act No. 529, the actual loans,[66] as shown in the promissory notes, were taken out from September 22, 1997 to March 26, 1998, during which time Republic Act No. 8183 was already in effect. In United Coconut Planters Bank v. Beluso,[67] we held that: [O]pening a credit line does not create a credit transaction of loan or mutuum, since the former is merely a preparatory contract to the contract of loan or mutuum. Under such credit line, the bank is merely obliged, for the considerations specified therefor, to lend to the other party amounts not exceeding the limit provided. The credit transaction thus occurred not when the credit line was opened, but rather when the credit line was availed of. x x x.[68]
	GR No. 184122 2010-01-20	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ABAD, J.
The question is whether or not the reference to the penalty charges in the promissory note constitutes substantial compliance with the disclosure requirement of the Truth in Lending Act.[45] The RTC and CA relied on the ruling in New Sampaguita as authority that the non-disclosure of the penalty charge renders its imposition illegal. But New Sampaguita is not attended by the same circumstances. What New Sampaguita disallowed, because it was not mentioned either in the disclosure statement or in the promissory note, was the unilateral increase in the rates of penalty charges that the creditor imposed on the borrower. Here, however, it is not shown that BPI increased the rate of penalty charge that it collected from the Yus. [46]
	GR No. 165697 2009-08-04	ANTONIO NAVARRO v. METROPOLITAN BANK PERALTA, J.
In United Coconut Planters Bank v. Belus[37] and Strongworld Construction Corporation v. Perello,[38] the Court held that where the complaint is dismissed on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; or that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, such dismissal operates as one with prejudice and which therefore precludes the filing of another action based on the same claim. Hence, according to Madrigal v. Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[39] such dismissal already constitutes res judicata.