This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2011-03-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,[33] the Court categorically declared Section 47 void. The Court held that: Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 -- the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads: | |||||
|
2011-03-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.,[17] the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive."[18] In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission,[19] the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive `franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization' to operate a public utility."[20] In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee."[22] In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,[23] the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."[24] | |||||
|
2010-10-19 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person.[33] Particularly, the term, franchise, "includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress."[34] The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than accurate. As stressed in Albano v. Reyes--a case decided under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution--there is nothing in the Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before "each and every public utility may operate," thus: That the Constitution provides x x x that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply x x x that only Congress has the power to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified agencies in the Executive Branch the power to issue such authorization for certain classes of public utilities.[35] (Emphasis ours.) | |||||
|
2010-03-13 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.[18] There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.[19] With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.[20] In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.[21] | |||||
|
2009-12-04 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Moreover, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that neither PIEDRAS nor the government sustained any loss in these transactions. In fact, after deducting the shares to be given to respondent banks as payment for the shares, PIEDRAS stood to gain about 1,540,781,554 class "A" and 710,550,000 class "B" OPMC shares virtually for free. Indeed, the question that must be asked is whether or not PIEDRAS, in the exercise of its pre-emptive rights, would have been able to acquire any of these shares at all if it did not enter into the financing agreements with the respondent banks.[80] Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS[81] nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion en pago transactions, unlike here where the government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of assets. | |||||