Lawyerly

GR Nos. 217126-27

2015-11-10

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,[114] it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[115] Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,[116] as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.[117] That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.

GR No. 191667

2015-04-22

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality's status as an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction[44] and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[45] Thus, as it has now come to the fore that any resolution of this case would not be possible and, hence, not attain any real finality due to the non-joinder of the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court's, and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable parties to the case and its immediate disposition on the merits.[46] With this, the propriety of the Municipality's present intervention is now mooted.

GR No. 188832

2014-04-23

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

LEONEN, J.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong."[36] This power is conferred by law,[37] which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.[38] If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.[39]

GR No. 188832

2014-04-23

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

LEONEN, J.

That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[59] The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."[60]

GR No. 158885

2009-10-02

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. [4]

GR No. 164789

2009-08-27

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY v. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO AND PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO

BRION, J.

Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development Corporation v. Villar[19] and Suntay v. Gocolay[20] that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.[21]

GR No. 180394

2008-09-29

MARJORIE B. CADIMAS v. MARITES CARRION

TINGA, J.

In the instances where the jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the complaint clearly showed that the case involved the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957,[25] or the complaint for specific performance sought to compel the subdivision developer to comply with its undertaking under the contract to sell,[26] or the claim by the subdivision developer would have been properly pleaded as a counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to avoid splitting causes of action.[27]

GR No. 174346

2008-09-12

FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA v. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.[18] That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them in estoppel.

GR No. 147406

2008-07-14

VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE

NACHURA, J.

Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[29] the Court clarified that:Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

GR No. 167988

2007-02-06

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The ruling in People v. Regalario[44] that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[45] on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.[46]

GR NO. 165724

2006-11-02

ZAMORA REALTY v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The law does not specifically provide the form of notice to be given to the owner/developer. Considering the purpose of the law and the evil sought to be prevented, the Court holds that a verbal notice of the intention to suspend remittance of payment is sufficient. Such a holding is consistent with our ruling in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[31] where the requirement of an HLURB clearance under Section 23, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 957 before the buyer of a subdivision lot or a home could lawfully withhold monthly payments was declared void. The Court explained:x x x [T]o require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyer of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.[32]

GR NO. 164136

2006-01-25

CARLOS R. TAMAYO v. MILAGROS HUANG

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.[30] (Italics supplied) Section 4 of the realty installment act directs as follows in case a buyer defaults in the payment of succeeding installments where he has paid less than two years of installments, as in petitioner's case:SECTION 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due.

	GR Nos. 217126-27 2015-11-10	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,[114] it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[115] Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,[116] as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.[117] That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
	GR No. 191667 2015-04-22	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality's status as an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction[44] and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[45] Thus, as it has now come to the fore that any resolution of this case would not be possible and, hence, not attain any real finality due to the non-joinder of the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court's, and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable parties to the case and its immediate disposition on the merits.[46] With this, the propriety of the Municipality's present intervention is now mooted.
	GR No. 188832 2014-04-23	VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT LEONEN, J.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong."[36] This power is conferred by law,[37] which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.[38] If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.[39]
	GR No. 188832 2014-04-23	VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT LEONEN, J.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.[59] The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action."[60]
	GR No. 158885 2009-10-02	FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CIR LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. [4]
	GR No. 164789 2009-08-27	CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY v. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO AND PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO BRION, J.
Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development Corporation v. Villar[19] and Suntay v. Gocolay[20] that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.[21]
	GR No. 180394 2008-09-29	MARJORIE B. CADIMAS v. MARITES CARRION TINGA, J.
In the instances where the jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the complaint clearly showed that the case involved the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957,[25] or the complaint for specific performance sought to compel the subdivision developer to comply with its undertaking under the contract to sell,[26] or the claim by the subdivision developer would have been properly pleaded as a counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to avoid splitting causes of action.[27]
	GR No. 174346 2008-09-12	FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA v. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI CARPIO MORALES, J.
Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.[18] That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them in estoppel.
	GR No. 147406 2008-07-14	VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE NACHURA, J.
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[29] the Court clarified that:Petitioner argues that the CA's affirmation of the trial court's dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
	GR No. 167988 2007-02-06	MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The ruling in People v. Regalario[44] that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[45] on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.[46]
	GR NO. 165724 2006-11-02	ZAMORA REALTY v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES CALLEJO, SR., J.
The law does not specifically provide the form of notice to be given to the owner/developer. Considering the purpose of the law and the evil sought to be prevented, the Court holds that a verbal notice of the intention to suspend remittance of payment is sufficient. Such a holding is consistent with our ruling in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[31] where the requirement of an HLURB clearance under Section 23, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 957 before the buyer of a subdivision lot or a home could lawfully withhold monthly payments was declared void. The Court explained:x x x [T]o require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyer of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.[32]
	GR NO. 164136 2006-01-25	CARLOS R. TAMAYO v. MILAGROS HUANG CARPIO MORALES, J.
Apropos, to require clearance from the HLURB before stopping payment would not be in keeping with the intent of the law to protect innocent buyers of lots or homes from scheming subdivision developers. To give full effect to such intent, it would be fitting to treat the right to stop payment to be immediately effective upon giving due notice to the owner or developer or upon filing a complaint before the HLURB against the erring developer. Such course of action would be without prejudice to the subsequent determination of its propriety and consequences, should the suspension of payment subsequently be found improper.[30] (Italics supplied) Section 4 of the realty installment act directs as follows in case a buyer defaults in the payment of succeeding installments where he has paid less than two years of installments, as in petitioner's case:SECTION 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due.

FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION v. RICARDO T. SYCIP