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REPUBLIC v. CRASUS L. IYOY

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 166357 2011-09-19	VALERIO E. KALAW v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ DEL CASTILLO, J.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
	GR No. 171042 2008-06-30	REPUBLIC v. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO CARPIO MORALES, J.
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized by (a) Gravity - It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability - It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[46] Dr. Gerong found that Martini's "personality disorders" including his being a "mama's boy" are "serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family."
	GR NO. 157610 2007-10-19	ORLANDO G. TONGOL v. FILIPINAS M. TONGOL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[5]
	AM No. RTJ-06-2030 2007-10-05	OCA v. JUDGE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication which requires that he should hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. A judge must neither sacrifice for expediency's sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially.[37] This is especially so since marriage, which is the subject of the case before Judge dela Peña, is legally inviolable; thus, it is protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties.[38]
	GR NO. 147824 2007-08-02	ROSA YAP PARAS v. JUSTO J. PARAS SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.[47] Thus:A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
	GR NO. 162368 2006-07-17	MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS v. BRIX FERRARIS YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.[19] No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.[20]
	GR NO. 139676 2006-03-31	REPUBLIC v. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor's Manifestation[26] that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-examination[27] which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.[28] Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.[29]