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GR No. 172980

2015-07-22

LEONEN, J.

We find no exceptional circumstance[31] to justify petitioners' omission to file a motion for reconsideration. Their allegation that the trial court was unable to resolve their many motions for a long time is belied by the facts on record. Their Motions to Dismiss and to lift the temporary restraining order were submitted for resolution on January 30, 2006. On March 3, 2006, a little over one month later, the trial court issued its impugned order. To our mind, this period of time does not constitute undue delay on the part of the trial court in resolving the motions.

GR No. 160067

2010-11-17

NELSON IMPERIAL v. MARICEL M. JOSON

PEREZ, J.

Although what constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsel is also subject to the sound discretion of the judge,[74] the fact that petitioners have filed their answer and third-party complaint in Civil Case No. 01-0325 also militates against the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which, at bottom, amounted to their being declared in default. Inasmuch as procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise been exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.[75] Time and again, this Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof.[76] Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[77]

GR No. 175145

2008-03-28

SPS. ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[41] It must be stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual issues.[42] By their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any.

GR NO. 167533

2007-07-27

AUDI AG v. JULES A. MEJIA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

First, petitioner failed to file with the trial court the requisite motion for reconsideration of the challenged Order before resorting to the instant recourse. The well-established rule is that a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Thus, petitioner should have first filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration, as such special civil action may be resorted to only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[6] Such indispensable requirement may, in well recognized instances, be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[7] Petitioner failed to show sufficient justification for its failure to comply with the requirement.

GR NO. 148273

2006-04-19

MILAGROS SIMON v. GUIA W. CANLAS

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this Court's standing admonition that the disposition of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the trial.[50] Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.[51]

GR NO. 170096-97

2006-03-03

RICARDO SANTOS v. ILUMINADA CRUZ

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The case of Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,[11] citing Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga,[12] clarified that "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari,[13] subject to certain exceptions, to wit:(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

GR No. 166755

2005-11-18

ELMER F. CERVANTES v. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

As held in Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga,[21] the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari,[22] subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

GR No. 149570

2004-03-15

HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

not to exceed the period of fifteen (15) years."[4] De Leon assigned her leasehold right in favor of the Second Quezon City Development Bank. The lease and De Leon's leasehold right were annotated at the back of TCT No. T-44349 as Entry Nos. 152248 and 152249,[5] respectively. Thereafter, Bienvenido Santos constructed a house thereon. In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April

GR No. 149570

2004-03-15

HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

the registration of the land subject of the donation in the name of Rosendo Florencio, which was, however, superseded by the untimely demise of Jose de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after Florencio's death in March of 1995.[10] On February 1, 1996, the heirs of De Leon, represented by Valeriana L. Morente, also filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of Bienvenido Santos before the MTC of San Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2062.[11] They prayed,

GR No. 149570

2004-03-15

HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

ownership.[31] The heirs of De Leon appealed the decisions of the MTC to the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 83, which rendered judgment reversing the decision of the court a quo. It held that the MTC had jurisdiction over the cases; as such, the trial court should proceed and render

	GR No. 172980 2015-07-22	CELSO F. PASCUAL v. CANIOGAN CREDIT LEONEN, J.
We find no exceptional circumstance[31] to justify petitioners' omission to file a motion for reconsideration. Their allegation that the trial court was unable to resolve their many motions for a long time is belied by the facts on record. Their Motions to Dismiss and to lift the temporary restraining order were submitted for resolution on January 30, 2006. On March 3, 2006, a little over one month later, the trial court issued its impugned order. To our mind, this period of time does not constitute undue delay on the part of the trial court in resolving the motions.
	GR No. 160067 2010-11-17	NELSON IMPERIAL v. MARICEL M. JOSON PEREZ, J.
Although what constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsel is also subject to the sound discretion of the judge,[74] the fact that petitioners have filed their answer and third-party complaint in Civil Case No. 01-0325 also militates against the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which, at bottom, amounted to their being declared in default. Inasmuch as procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise been exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.[75] Time and again, this Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof.[76] Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[77]
	GR No. 175145 2008-03-28	SPS. ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[41] It must be stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual issues.[42] By their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any.
	GR NO. 167533 2007-07-27	AUDI AG v. JULES A. MEJIA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
First, petitioner failed to file with the trial court the requisite motion for reconsideration of the challenged Order before resorting to the instant recourse. The well-established rule is that a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Thus, petitioner should have first filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration, as such special civil action may be resorted to only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[6] Such indispensable requirement may, in well recognized instances, be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[7] Petitioner failed to show sufficient justification for its failure to comply with the requirement.
	GR NO. 148273 2006-04-19	MILAGROS SIMON v. GUIA W. CANLAS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. However, it must be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this Court's standing admonition that the disposition of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the trial.[50] Indeed, court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.[51]
	GR NO. 170096-97 2006-03-03	RICARDO SANTOS v. ILUMINADA CRUZ YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The case of Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,[11] citing Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga,[12] clarified that "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari,[13] subject to certain exceptions, to wit:(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
	GR No. 166755 2005-11-18	ELMER F. CERVANTES v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
As held in Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga,[21] the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari,[22] subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
	GR No. 149570 2004-03-15	HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON CALLEJO, SR., J.
not to exceed the period of fifteen (15) years."[4] De Leon assigned her leasehold right in favor of the Second Quezon City Development Bank. The lease and De Leon's leasehold right were annotated at the back of TCT No. T-44349 as Entry Nos. 152248 and 152249,[5] respectively. Thereafter, Bienvenido Santos constructed a house thereon. In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April
	GR No. 149570 2004-03-15	HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON CALLEJO, SR., J.
the registration of the land subject of the donation in the name of Rosendo Florencio, which was, however, superseded by the untimely demise of Jose de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after Florencio's death in March of 1995.[10] On February 1, 1996, the heirs of De Leon, represented by Valeriana L. Morente, also filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of Bienvenido Santos before the MTC of San Miguel, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2062.[11] They prayed,
	GR No. 149570 2004-03-15	HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE LEON CALLEJO, SR., J.
ownership.[31] The heirs of De Leon appealed the decisions of the MTC to the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 83, which rendered judgment reversing the decision of the court a quo. It held that the MTC had jurisdiction over the cases; as such, the trial court should proceed and render

ROSALINO P. ACANCE v. CA