This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-08-28 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The Court deems it proper to allow due course to the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 in the broader interest of substantial justice, particularly because the NLRC's appellate adjudication was set aside by the CA, and in order to put at rest the doubt that the CA, in so doing, exercised its judicial authority oppressively. Whether the petition was proper or not should be of less importance than whether the CA gravely erred in undoing and setting aside the determination of the NLRC as a reviewing forum vis-à-vis the Labor Arbiter. We note in this regard that the NLRC had declared the dismissal of petitioner to be harsh and not commensurate to the infraction committed. Given the spirit and intention underlying our labor laws of resolving a doubtful situation in favor of the working man, we will have to review the judgment of the CA to ascertain whether the NLRC had really committed grave abuse of its discretion. This will settle the doubts on the propriety of terminating petitioner, and at the same time ensure that justice is served to the parties.[18] | |||||
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2010-05-05 |
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| Verily, in numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time- honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[37] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[38] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[39] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. [40] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[41] In the case at bar, considering that the same involves the various claims of 371 respondents, this Court finds that justice and equity are best served by allowing respondents to prove their case on the merits rather than denying them their day in court on a strict application of the rules. | |||||
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2008-06-26 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled. It is the policy of the Court to afford every litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, courts must avoid the rigid application thereof which tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. [7] Here, the counsel for respondent, upon receiving the order dismissing the complaint, immediately filed a motion for reconsideration which adequately explained his late arrival for four (4) minutes, which was not disputed before the trial court. Under the circumstances, the latter should have granted respondent's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint. The interest of justice will be better served by the continuation of the proceedings and final disposition of the case on the merits before the trial court. Thus, the appellate court did not commit any reversible error when it set aside the order of the trial court dismissing the respondent's complaint. | |||||
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2007-08-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Verily, litigation is not a game of technicalities. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[25] Indeed, on numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.[26] Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.[27] Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[28] In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[29] For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[30] | |||||
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2005-11-15 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It has been held that a one-day delay does not justify the appeal's denial where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to the petitioner.[26] Needless to stress, the real purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.[27] | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| ... (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsel's negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [30] | |||||