This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-06-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely legal issue has remained unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935 Constitution. There is no reason for this Court to evade this ever recurring fundamental issue and delay again defining the term "capital," which appears not only in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, but also in Section 2, Article XII on co-production and joint venture agreements for the development of our natural resources,[19] in Section 7, Article XII on ownership of private lands,[20] in Section 10, Article XII on the reservation of certain investments to Filipino citizens,[21] in Section 4(2), Article XIV on the ownership of educational institutions,[22] and in Section 11(2), Article XVI on the ownership of advertising companies.[23] | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We agree with the RTC but hasten to point out that the RTC had not ruled on whether the petition was also improper as a petition for prohibition. Indeed, under Section 1,[27] Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extra-judicial sale[28] and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already suspended paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No. 957 and relied upon -- correctly or otherwise -- by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:[29] | |||||
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2008-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down anytime.[48] In Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat,[49] we declared that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bonds anyone, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing therefrom are void. In the Petition at bar, since the Regional Adjudicator is evidently without jurisdiction to rule on respondents' complaint without the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and the petitioner, then the Decision he rendered is void. | |||||
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2007-03-22 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Even from a cursory reading of the appeal, it is indelibly clear that the trial court committed an appalling blunder when it ruled that an action for foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years from the date of the mortgage contract. Under Article 1142 of the Civil Code, a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years. Jurisprudence, however, has clarified this rule by holding that a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrued,[14] which is obviously not the same as the date of the mortgage contract. Stated differently, an action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgage creditor will lose his rights under the mortgage.[15] The right of action accrues when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee.[16] | |||||
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2007-03-22 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Even from a cursory reading of the appeal, it is indelibly clear that the trial court committed an appalling blunder when it ruled that an action for foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years from the date of the mortgage contract. Under Article 1142 of the Civil Code, a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years. Jurisprudence, however, has clarified this rule by holding that a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrued,[14] which is obviously not the same as the date of the mortgage contract. Stated differently, an action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgage creditor will lose his rights under the mortgage.[15] The right of action accrues when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee.[16] | |||||