This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2016-01-11 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity;[36] or, (b) a nuisance per accidens, which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;"[37] it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.[38] | |||||
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2013-12-10 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[18] the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.[19] | |||||
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2013-03-12 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.[30] | |||||
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2010-12-07 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35] | |||||
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2010-12-07 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.[43] | |||||
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2010-12-07 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure"- an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46] | |||||
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2009-12-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x | |||||
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2008-03-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,[41] this Court already provided a discourse on due process, to wit:The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law x x x." | |||||
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2007-03-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right.[42] In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. | |||||