This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-06-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| The Court, as a rule, observes this Rule 45 proscription as this Court is not a trier of facts.[36] The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower tribunals or bodies whose findings, when duly supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA, bind this Court.[37] | |||||
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2011-11-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Despite the above propositions, We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI's SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the FWBs. As this Court held in Perez-Rosario v. CA:[64] | |||||
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2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner's rights to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowner's rights"[49] impels us to uphold Antonio's dispossession as ordered by the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them."[50] In Perez-Rosario vs. Court of Appeals,[51] this Court laid down the following precepts regarding the resolution of agrarian disputes: It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political disturbances that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people as well as the continuity of the national order. To subdue these acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of the nation passed a series of laws calculated to accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material standards of living and eliminate discontent. Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of social justice found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing national consciousness, all command the great departments of government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the law. But annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on her side. In the occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony, the considerations of social advantage must be weighed, an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social interdependence of these interests, recognized.[52] | |||||
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2009-07-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Prefatorily, it is needless to state that in appeals in agrarian cases, long-standing is the rule that when the appellate court has confirmed that the findings of fact of the agrarian courts are borne out by the records, such findings are conclusive and binding on this Court.[28] In other words, issues of fact that have already been decided by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be interfered with by this Court or be reviewed anew, except only upon a showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the department head or a total lack of substantial evidence to support the decision.[29] None of these circumstances which would otherwise require an independent factual evaluation of the issues raised in the present petition, obtains in this case. On the contrary, we find that the decision of the DARAB, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is substantially supported by the evidence on record. | |||||
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2007-06-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A petition under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. And under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, an error in the choice or mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.[16] | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. [32] Hence, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.[33] This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a "precautionary measure" for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao,[34] the Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case. [35] | |||||