This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| While it is true that the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own the land, still, the Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which include the agricultural lands. It was explained that the "equitable interest of the shareholder in the property of the corporation is represented by the term stock, and the extent of his interest is described by the term shares. The expression shares of stock when qualified by words indicating number and ownership expresses the extent of the owner's interest in the corporate property." [119] A share of stock typifies an aliquot part of the corporation's property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation. [120] However, the FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands owned by the corporation when the corporation is eventually dissolved and liquidated. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T. Buenaflor,[23] Cariño v. de Castro,[24] Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[25] Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[26] Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[27] and People v. Santiago,[28] where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA. | |||||
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2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| On the theory of the defense that the DOJ is the principal party who may file the instant petition, the ruling in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa[13] is instructive. The Court thus enunciated:In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. x x x. On the alleged wrong mode of appeal by petitioner, suffice it to state that the rule is well-settled that in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only errors of law may be raised,[14] and herein petitioner certainly raised a question of law. | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| We are cognizant of our ruling in the cases of Perez v. Hagonoy,[15] Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[16] People v. Santiago,[17] and Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[18] where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or state in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. At the same time, we acknowledged in those cases that a private offended party, in the interest of substantial justice, and where there appears to be a grave error committed by the judge, or where there is lack of due process, may allow and give due course to the petition filed. However, the special circumstances prevailing in the abovementioned cases are not present in the instant case. In those cases, the petitioners availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the instant case, the petition was filed under Rule 45. Moreover, both the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court found that petitioner was not duly authorized by the owner of the subject property to collect and receive rentals thereon. Thus, not only were the checks without valuable consideration; they were also issued for a non-existing account. With these undisputed findings, we cannot reconcile petitioner's allegation that she is the aggrieved party. Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim that she was denied due process considering that she availed of every opportunity to present her case. Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower courts in dismissing the complaints. | |||||
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2008-03-26 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Parenthetically, the public prosecutor was not allowed by the trial court judge to question the victim although he asked for leave to ask additional questions after the private prosecutor was done with his questions on direct examination. Instead of granting the requested leave outright, the trial judge consulted the defense counsel and the private prosecutor who both manifested that whatever questions the public prosecutor had in mind should be coursed through and asked by the private prosecutor. Thus, the trial judge directed the private prosecutor to propound whatever questions the public prosecutor would suggest.[24] At this juncture, we find it necessary to remind trial court judges that under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case to the private prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial.[25] | |||||