This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2014-04-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over 1,782 hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which includes an area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were then transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006, assigned to petitioner McArthur.[2] | |||||
|
2011-01-31 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Petitioner alleges that the CA committed an error of law in ruling that arbitration cannot proceed despite the fact that: (a) it had ruled, in its assailed decision, that the arbitration clause is valid, enforceable and binding on the parties; (b) the case of Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.[11] is inapplicable here; (c) parties are generally allowed, under the Rules of Court, to adopt several defenses, alternatively or hypothetically, even if such defenses are inconsistent with each other; and (d) the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court is premature. | |||||
|
2009-11-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| It is clear from the above-quoted pronouncements of the Court that, pending approval or disapproval by the Provincial Governor of a contract entered into by a municipality which falls under the provisions of Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract is considered voidable. In the instant case, there is no showing that the contract of sale entered into between Pedro and the Municipality of Marikina was ever acted upon by the Provincial Governor. Hence, consistent with the rulings enunciated above, the subject contract should be considered voidable. Voidable or annullable contracts, before they are set aside, are existent, valid, and binding, and are effective and obligatory between the parties.[20] | |||||
|
2009-10-23 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| Petitioner nevertheless contends that the legality of the pre-termination fee clause is not arbitrable, citing Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd. [17] which declared that the therein complaint should be brought before the regular courts, and not before an arbitral tribunal, as it involved a judicial issue. Held the Court: We agree that the case should not be brought under the ambit of the Arbitration Law xxx. The question of validity of the contract containing the agreement to submit to arbitration will affect the applicability of the arbitration clause itself. A party cannot rely on the contract and claim rights or obligations under it and at the same time impugn its existence or validity. Indeed, litigants are enjoined from taking inconsistent positions. As previously discussed, the complaint should have been filed before the regular courts as it involved issues which are judicial in nature.[18] | |||||
|
2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Olympic and Citinickel claim that the doctrine that should be applied in these consolidated cases is that laid down in Gonzales v. Climax-Arimco Mining,[16] not the doctrine settled in the Celestial case. Admittedly, the tribunals or bodies participating in the jurisdictional conflict in the present consolidated cases more closely resemble those involved in Gonzales than those in Celestial. Gonzales involved the issue of whether or not it was the regular court or the POA that has jurisdiction to resolve the presented dispute. Celestial, on the other hand, involved the issue of whether or not it was the Secretary of the DENR or the POA who has jurisdiction to cancel a mining lease contract or existing mineral agreement. Under the ruling in Gonzales that: [T]he resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are applicable to the dispute, the interpretation and application of those laws, and the rendering of a judgment based thereon. Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially judicial. The complaint was not merely for the determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of those contracts is put in issue. | |||||
|
2009-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The requirement that petitioner should sign the Certification against Forum Shopping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction between natural and juridical persons.[25] A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.[26] The signatory, therefore, in the case of the corporation should be "a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation" who has knowledge of the matter being certified.[27] | |||||
|
2006-04-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[16] this Court observed that the trend has been to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter, although it does not mean that administrative bodies have complete rein over mining disputes. In several cases on mining disputes, the Court recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding conflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.[17] | |||||
|
2005-03-31 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the exercise of a judicial function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. As opposed to a moot question or one properly decided by the executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the courts.[35] | |||||