This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-08-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Secondly, while records show that KTC acquired its rights and interests over the subject properties from Little Giant through the February 24, 2003 Deed of Assignment,[44] Je-An, the vendee under the January 15, 2003 Contract to Sell of the same properties, was privy to the conveyance to KTC since its representative, i.e., Achurra, was the one who executed the said deed of assignment in favor of KTC in behalf of Little Giant. Such is apparent from the "Brief Statement of Claims and Defenses"[45] in the pre-trial[46] brief dated September 10, 2010 filed by Je-An and Achurra in Civil Case Nos. 69973 and 69988 before the same RTC - i.e., the consolidated cases for: (a) annulment of contract to sell and deed of assignment, cancellation of titles, annulment of mortgage, accounting and damages, filed by Diokno as representative of Little Giant and for his own behalf against Je-An and Achurra; and (b) specific performance and damages filed by Je-An, represented by Achurra, against Diokno - and is inconsistent with Je-An's claim of adverse possession against KTC in this case. | |||||
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2011-02-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In addition, it is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation.[11] There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[12] Ultimately, the question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.[13] It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[14] It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.[15] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote,[78] we held that the subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with the foreign employer is void, simply because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The subsequent agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved by the POEA. Republic Act No. 8042, commonly known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995, expressly prohibits the substitution or alteration, to the prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same, without the approval of DOLE.[79] Since the second employment contract petitioner Nisda signed with respondent ADAMS was void for not having been sanctioned by the POEA, then petitioner Nisda's employment with respondent ADAMS was still governed by his POEA-SEC until his repatriation to the Philippines on 17 July 2002. | |||||
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2009-04-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what should have been done, but failed to do so. Conversely, if the said party did not have the occasion to assert the right, then, he cannot be adjudged guilty of laches. Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time; rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.[43] | |||||
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2008-11-14 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of the POEA-approved contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the approved contract with another upon the worker's arrival in the country of employment. Such outcome is certainly contrary to the State's policy of extending protection and support to our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.[22] | |||||
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2007-08-31 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Neither can LICOMCEN find refuge in the principle of laches to steer clear of liability. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it. [46] | |||||
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2007-01-31 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| The second issue in the instant petition is whether or not estoppel bars the claim of Spouses Co Chien. There are generally three kinds of estoppel: (1) estoppel in pais; (2) estoppel by deed; and (3) estoppel by laches. In the first classification, a person is considered in estoppel if by his conduct, representations or admissions or silence when he ought to speak out, whether intentionally or through culpable negligence, "causes another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."[31] Estoppel by deed, on the other hand, occurs when a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from denying any material fact stated in the said deed as against the other party and his privies.[32] Estoppel by laches is considered an equitable estoppel wherein a person who failed or neglected to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time is presumed to have abandoned or otherwise declined to assert such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the same, to the prejudice of the other party, who has no notice or knowledge that the former would assert such rights and whose condition has so changed that the latter cannot, without injury or prejudice, be restored to his former state.[33] | |||||