This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-08-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.[83] Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain here[84] as petitioner was perfectly within its right to remove the improvements introduced in the subject plantation. Article 21, on the other hand, refers to acts contra bonus mores.[85] The act is within the article only when it is done willfully. The act is willful if it is done with knowledge of its injurious effect; it is not required that the act be done purposely to produce the injury.[86] Undoubtedly, petitioner removed the pipes with knowledge of its injurious effect which is the destruction of the banana plants and fruits; and failed to cover the diggings which caused ground destruction. Petitioner should, therefore, be liable for damages. | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes,[45] we ruled that a person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.[64] | |||||
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2009-08-24 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| From these facts, we find that bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of petitioner. Petitioner's exercise of its rights under the agreement to conduct an audit, to vary the manner of processing purchase orders, and to refuse the renewal of the agreement was supported by legitimate reasons, principally, to protect its own business. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to injure or prejudice respondents. The rights exercised were all in accord with the terms and conditions of the distributorship agreement, which has the force of law between them.[39] Clearly, petitioner could not be said to have committed an abuse of its rights. It may not be amiss to state at this juncture that a complaint based on Article 19 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to support it but innuendos and conjectures.[40] | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| It has been held that Article 19,[7] known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of this article is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.[8] Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the following elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and (3) is done with intent to injure. The common element under Articles 19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be intentional,[9] and attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21,[10] or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.[11] In the case before us, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the circumstances do not warrant an award of damages. Thus, the award of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages is quite preposterous. We agree with the appellate court that in the action of the respondents, there was no malicious intent to injure petitioner's good name and reputation. The respondents merely wanted to call the attention of responsible government agencies in order to secure appropriate action upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for their grievances. So, we reiterate the basic postulate that in the absence of proof that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents, no damages can be awarded. | |||||