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SIMPLICIO GALICIA v. LOURDES MANLIQUEZ VDA. DE MINDO

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2012-07-18
SERENO, J.
In Galicia v. Manliquez,[23] the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found that the defendant-intervenors were indispensable parties, being the indisputable compulsory co-heirs of the original defendants in the case for recovery of possession and ownership, and annulment of title. Thus, without them, there could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they certainly stood to be affected by any judgment in the case, considering their "ostensible ownership of the property."
2011-11-14
PERALTA, J.
In this case, however, as aptly held by the RTC and CA, Norma is estopped from invoking the rule on indispensable party. Estoppel by laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[51]  There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.[52]
2011-09-07
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier--negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[28]  There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[29]
2009-11-27
BRION, J.
The petitioners submit that the respondent's children, who succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners of the property, are indispensable parties because a full determination of the case cannot be made without their presence, relying on Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,[22] Orbeta v. Sendiong,[23] and Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo.[24] They argue that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a fatal jurisdictional defect.
2009-09-18
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[26]
2009-06-05
PUNO, J.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court.[47] As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.[48] It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.[49] This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.[50]
2008-02-27
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Under the rules on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[14] Discretion is a faculty of a court or an official by which he may decide a question either way, and still be right.[15] The permissive tenor of the rules shows an intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari or controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.[16]
2007-12-14
TINGA, J,
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and and their properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[55]
2001-11-29
PARDO, J.
On August 13, 1996, Juanita T. Sering filed with the trial court a notice of appeal[13] of the decision to the Court of Appeals.[14]
2001-11-29
PARDO, J.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals[25] in toto.