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GR No. 174202

2015-04-07

DYNAMIC BUILDERS v. RICARDO P. PRESBITERO

LEONEN, J.

Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading ing any material aspect pertinent to a national government infrastructure project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting provisional reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should decide the case on the merits.[86] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

GR No. 181293

2015-02-23

ANA THERESIA “RISA” IVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

SERENO, C.J.

The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance of provisional orders enjoining the implementation of a national government project. R.A. 8975 does not bar lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints that seek the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project as ultimate relief.[124]

GR No. 182559

2009-03-13

COA v. LINK WORTH INTERNATIONAL

TINGA, J.

No award of damages can be made in favor of Audio Visual in this case, however. COA is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own. Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent.[25] Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio Visual can be taken as an implied consent to be sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari proceedings,[26] Link Worth did not appeal the Court of Appeals' Decision deleting the award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link Worth is bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including the deletion of the award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.[27]

GR No. 167500

2008-10-17

K-PHIL. v. METROPOLITAN BANK

CORONA, J.

Network's name was indeed omitted from the caption of the application/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. However, this omission was not fatal to Metrobank's application as it was not in violation of Act 3135.[19] Moreover, the application included Network in its body. It is the allegations in the body of the petition that control and not the heading or caption.[20] The notice clearly identified Network as the mortgagor. Such identification in the notice of extrajudicial sale was what counted under the rules of procedure in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.[21]

GR NO. 163705

2007-07-30

NOMER OCAMPO v. PEOPLE

TINGA, J.

SO ORDERED.[49] It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision prevails over the opinion, the former being the final order while the opinion is an informal expression of the views of the court, thus forming no part of the judgment.[50] Following this rule, the appellate court thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance but not conspiracy.

GR NO. 162243

2006-11-29

HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Moreover, as we held in Republic v. Nolasco,[78] statutes such as Presidential Decree No. 605, Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction. We further held in Nolasco:However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. x x x.[79]

GR NO. 149118

2006-02-16

FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON v. SPS. SANTIAGO AND FORTUNATA BATUYONG

TINGA, J.

Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed,[31] i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity,[32] as the courts below pointed out.[33] In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary.

AM NO. P-04-1791

2006-01-27

RAUL H. SESBREÑO v. LORNA O. IGONIA

CARPIO, J.

We have consistently ruled that it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading, and on the basis of such allegations, the pleading may be legally characterized. [30] In other words, to determine the nature of a pleading, one must not rely on its caption or title, but on the contents or allegations of the body of the pleading.

GR NO. 167968

2006-01-23

VICENTE FLORENTINO v. RIVERA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." [19] We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco [20] where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, [21] we said:More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." [22] While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. [23]

GR NO. 147479

2005-09-26

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. PAULINO FRANCO

In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco,[21] this Court reiterated the difference between a judgment and an opinion:More to the point is another well recognized doctrine, that the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, . . . there is a distinction between the findings of and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6) At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51.) It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. (Emphasis supplied)

	GR No. 174202 2015-04-07	DYNAMIC BUILDERS v. RICARDO P. PRESBITERO LEONEN, J.
Thus, when a court is called upon to rule on an initiatory pleading ing any material aspect pertinent to a national government infrastructure project, the court ordinarily may not dismiss the action based solely on Republic Act No. 8975 but is merely enjoined from granting provisional reliefs. If no other ground obtains to dismiss the action, the court should decide the case on the merits.[86] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
	GR No. 181293 2015-02-23	ANA THERESIA “RISA” IVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD SERENO, C.J.
The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance of provisional orders enjoining the implementation of a national government project. R.A. 8975 does not bar lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints that seek the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project as ultimate relief.[124]
	GR No. 182559 2009-03-13	COA v. LINK WORTH INTERNATIONAL TINGA, J.
No award of damages can be made in favor of Audio Visual in this case, however. COA is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own. Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its consent.[25] Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio Visual can be taken as an implied consent to be sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari proceedings,[26] Link Worth did not appeal the Court of Appeals' Decision deleting the award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link Worth is bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including the deletion of the award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.[27]
	GR No. 167500 2008-10-17	K-PHIL. v. METROPOLITAN BANK CORONA, J.
Network's name was indeed omitted from the caption of the application/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. However, this omission was not fatal to Metrobank's application as it was not in violation of Act 3135.[19] Moreover, the application included Network in its body. It is the allegations in the body of the petition that control and not the heading or caption.[20] The notice clearly identified Network as the mortgagor. Such identification in the notice of extrajudicial sale was what counted under the rules of procedure in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.[21]
	GR NO. 163705 2007-07-30	NOMER OCAMPO v. PEOPLE TINGA, J.
SO ORDERED.[49] It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision prevails over the opinion, the former being the final order while the opinion is an informal expression of the views of the court, thus forming no part of the judgment.[50] Following this rule, the appellate court thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance but not conspiracy.
	GR NO. 162243 2006-11-29	HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Moreover, as we held in Republic v. Nolasco,[78] statutes such as Presidential Decree No. 605, Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribe the issuance of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. They cannot, under pain of violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction. We further held in Nolasco:However, it must be clarified that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects. What is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions. It does not preclude the lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over complaints or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project. A statute such as Republic Act No. 8975 cannot diminish the constitutionally mandated judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. x x x.[79]
	GR NO. 149118 2006-02-16	FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON v. SPS. SANTIAGO AND FORTUNATA BATUYONG TINGA, J.
Moreover, there is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed,[31] i.e., government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of regularity,[32] as the courts below pointed out.[33] In this case, the verification survey was conducted by a government functionary.
	AM NO. P-04-1791 2006-01-27	RAUL H. SESBREÑO v. LORNA O. IGONIA CARPIO, J.
We have consistently ruled that it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading, and on the basis of such allegations, the pleading may be legally characterized. [30] In other words, to determine the nature of a pleading, one must not rely on its caption or title, but on the contents or allegations of the body of the pleading.
	GR NO. 167968 2006-01-23	VICENTE FLORENTINO v. RIVERA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." [19] We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco [20] where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, [21] we said:More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." [22] While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. [23]
	GR NO. 147479 2005-09-26	DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. PAULINO FRANCO
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco,[21] this Court reiterated the difference between a judgment and an opinion:More to the point is another well recognized doctrine, that the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, . . . there is a distinction between the findings of and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6) At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51.) It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision. (Emphasis supplied)

REPUBLIC v. EMILIANO R. NOLASCO