This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2011-04-11 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Having already discussed the matter extensively in the decision sought to be reconsidered, we no longer find any reason to go into great detail in discussing the reasons why the first and second causes of action pleaded in STRADEC's 31 July 2006 amended complaint qualify as intra-corporate disputes cognizable by Branch 2 of the RTC of Batangas City, sitting as a Special Commercial Court (SCC). Fundamental is the rule that nature of the action, as well as the court or body which has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[24] It has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, which should not be alleged in the complaint in the first place, are considered for purposes of applying the test.[25] Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test already discussed in our 17 November 2010 decision, we find that STRADEC's causes of action for the nullification of the loan and pledge over its SIDC shareholdings contracted by respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla as well as the avoidance of the notarial sale conducted by respondent Raymond M. Caraos both qualify as intra-corporate disputes.[26] It cannot, therefore, be argued that said causes of action were misjoined with STRADEC's third and fourth causes of action for the cancellation of the transfer of its shares in SIDEC's books, the invalidation of the 30 July 2005 and 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders' meetings, attorney's fees and the costs. | |||||
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2011-04-11 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, the court in which an action is pending may, concededly, hold the action in abeyance in the exercise of sound discretion, to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court,[31] especially where the parties and the issues are the same.[32] While applicable as between the actions pending before the courts of Pasig City and Urdaneta City which were supposedly instituted to determine the ownership of the controlling shares of stock of STRADEC as well as its legitimate Board of Directors, said principle cannot, however, apply to said cases vis-à-vis the one at bench which, at bottom, seek the nullification of the loan and pledge over said corporation's shareholdings in SIDC as well as the subsequent notarial sale thereof. Even then, we find that respondents cannot expediently argue that the defects in the impugned loan, pledge and notarial sale would be automatically discounted by a declaration from the Pasay City and Urdaneta City courts that respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla's group constitute said corporation's legitimate Board of Directors. Assuming, arguendo, that respondents are justified in equating such determination with due authorization for the loan and pledge over STRADEC's shares in SIDC, we find that it would not still dispose of the issue of the alleged lack of consideration for the same transactions and the fraud which supposedly attended the execution of the same. | |||||
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2009-01-12 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| First. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.[17] This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when a motion for reconsideration would be useless under the circumstances.[18] | |||||
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2007-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Although the rule is properly applicable to instances involving two court actions, the peculiar circumstances in Quiambao warranted the application of the rule by analogy.[37] The principle was reiterated in Abacan, Jr. v. Northwestern University, Inc. [38] where the Court held that the presence or absence of liability for allowing the withdrawal of money from the university's bank account is reliant on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as to which of the two factions is the de jure board of directors. | |||||
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2007-10-02 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7] A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[8] This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.[9] | |||||
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2007-07-27 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| First, petitioner failed to file with the trial court the requisite motion for reconsideration of the challenged Order before resorting to the instant recourse. The well-established rule is that a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Thus, petitioner should have first filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration, as such special civil action may be resorted to only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[6] Such indispensable requirement may, in well recognized instances, be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[7] Petitioner failed to show sufficient justification for its failure to comply with the requirement. | |||||