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GR No. 159941

2011-08-17

HEIRS OF SPS. TEOFILO M. RETERTA AND ELISA RETERTA v. SPS. LORENZO MORES AND VIRGINIA LOPEZ

BERSAMIN, J.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.[12] A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.[13] It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.[14]

GR No. 190710

2011-06-06

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS

NACHURA, J.

Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [21] In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.

GR No. 183141

2009-09-18

EDGARDO H. CATINDIG v. PEOPLE

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It is a fundamental principle that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a Motion to Dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the Motion to Dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]

GR No. 176141

2008-12-16

GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM

REYES, R.T., J.

On April 12, 2005, respondent moved for reconsideration.[11] He contended that the February 23, 2005 ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 161309[12] invalidated or rendered moot the RTC decision.

GR No. 176141

2008-12-16

GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM

REYES, R.T., J.

The trial court rendered its decision before it was notified of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 161309.[38] Respondent appealed the decision, which appeal is now pending before the CA. At the same time, he filed G.R. No. 169476[39] before this Court, seeking a declaration of indirect contempt against the RTC judge and petitioners' counsel, for allegedly disobeying the remand order in G.R. No. 161309.[40]

GR No. 176141

2008-12-16

GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM

REYES, R.T., J.

Petitioner's reliance on the Court's pronouncement in the contempt proceeding[41] is misplaced. G.R. No. 169476[42] resolved that petitioner's counsel and the RTC presiding judge were not guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the decision in G.R. No. 161309.[43] The case did not rule on the validity of the RTC decision but instead noted that an appeal was pending before the CA where the issue should be properly addressed. Speaking through Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, this Court expressly stated: The sole issue here is whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.

GR No. 176141

2008-12-16

GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM

REYES, R.T., J.

Undaunted, respondent went up to this Court in G.R. No. 161309 entitled Lu Ym v. Nabua,[4] seeking a review of the CA decision and resolution.[5] On February 23, 2005, this Court partly granted respondent's petition and ordered a remand to the RTC for further proceedings to resolve anew with deliberate dispatch the motion to dismiss, disposing thus:

GR No. 138437

2008-11-14

RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can the denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

AM No. MTJ-05-1572

2008-01-30

IN RE: PARTIAL REPORT ON RESULTS OF JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN MTCC

PER CURIAM

Under Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, judges are mandated to directly prepare a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. This requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, judges do so through the process of legal reasoning. The Court beseeches judges to take pains in crafting their orders, stating clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuances, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken.[16]

GR NO. 164934

2007-08-14

HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL

QUISUMBING, J.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[18] Thus, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.[19] It is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[20] Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]

GR NO. 152575

2007-06-29

FIL-ESTATE GOLF v. FELICIDAD NAVARRO

CARPIO, J.

Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.[6] We agree with the Court of Appeals in finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. However, we agree with petitioner that the docket fees paid were insufficient and that the clerk of court should reassess and determine the correct docket fees based on the assessed or estimated value of the subject properties for respondent to pay.

GR NOS. 159669 - 163521

2007-03-12

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. v. ROSEMOORE MINING

TINGA, J.

The Bank adverts to the content requirement of an order denying a motion to dismiss prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The Court in Lu Ym v. Nabua[60] made a thorough discussion on the matter, to quote:Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules provides:

GR NO. 151001

2006-09-08

DR. MELANIO MALICDEM v. ROMEO FLORES

CORONA, J.

The special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss was merely interlocutory. It neither terminated nor finally disposed of the case as it still left something to be done by the court before the case was finally decided on the merits.[30] This being so, the general rule applied: the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[31]

GR NO. 169476

2006-06-16

DOUGLAS LU YM v. ATTY. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

SO ORDERED.[8] Invoking the decision in G.R. No. 161309, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the March 16, 2005 decision of the trial court be set aside.[9] However, on May 20, 2005, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. Pertinent portion of his order denying the motion, provides: This Court received copy of above-cited Decision on March 28, 2005, after it has rendered decision in the main case on March 16, 2005. This Court has complied with the mandate of the Supreme Court to further proceed into the case and to resolve with deliberate dispatch. Only that, it has not only resolved the Motion to Dismiss but the whole case.

GR NO. 147058

2006-03-10

DAVAO LIGHT v. JUDGE OF RTC DAVAO CITY

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

It has long been settled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order. It neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits, and as such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari.[16] In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] In this case, the Court finds none.

GR NO. 152228

2005-09-23

RIMBUNAN HIJAU GROUP OF COMPANIES v. ORIENTAL WOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION

From the outset, it is worthy of note that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[37]

	GR No. 159941 2011-08-17	HEIRS OF SPS. TEOFILO M. RETERTA AND ELISA RETERTA v. SPS. LORENZO MORES AND VIRGINIA LOPEZ BERSAMIN, J.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.[12] A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.[13] It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.[14]
	GR No. 190710 2011-06-06	JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS NACHURA, J.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [21] In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
	GR No. 183141 2009-09-18	EDGARDO H. CATINDIG v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is a fundamental principle that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a Motion to Dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the Motion to Dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]
	GR No. 176141 2008-12-16	GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM REYES, R.T., J.
On April 12, 2005, respondent moved for reconsideration.[11] He contended that the February 23, 2005 ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 161309[12] invalidated or rendered moot the RTC decision.
	GR No. 176141 2008-12-16	GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM REYES, R.T., J.
The trial court rendered its decision before it was notified of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 161309.[38] Respondent appealed the decision, which appeal is now pending before the CA. At the same time, he filed G.R. No. 169476[39] before this Court, seeking a declaration of indirect contempt against the RTC judge and petitioners' counsel, for allegedly disobeying the remand order in G.R. No. 161309.[40]
	GR No. 176141 2008-12-16	GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM REYES, R.T., J.
Petitioner's reliance on the Court's pronouncement in the contempt proceeding[41] is misplaced. G.R. No. 169476[42] resolved that petitioner's counsel and the RTC presiding judge were not guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the decision in G.R. No. 161309.[43] The case did not rule on the validity of the RTC decision but instead noted that an appeal was pending before the CA where the issue should be properly addressed. Speaking through Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, this Court expressly stated: The sole issue here is whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.
	GR No. 176141 2008-12-16	GERTRUDES NABUA v. DOUGLAS LU YM REYES, R.T., J.
Undaunted, respondent went up to this Court in G.R. No. 161309 entitled Lu Ym v. Nabua,[4] seeking a review of the CA decision and resolution.[5] On February 23, 2005, this Court partly granted respondent's petition and ordered a remand to the RTC for further proceedings to resolve anew with deliberate dispatch the motion to dismiss, disposing thus:
	GR No. 138437 2008-11-14	RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can the denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
	AM No. MTJ-05-1572 2008-01-30	IN RE: PARTIAL REPORT ON RESULTS OF JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN MTCC PER CURIAM
Under Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, judges are mandated to directly prepare a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. This requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, judges do so through the process of legal reasoning. The Court beseeches judges to take pains in crafting their orders, stating clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuances, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken.[16]
	GR NO. 164934 2007-08-14	HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL QUISUMBING, J.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[18] Thus, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.[19] It is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[20] Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[21]
	GR NO. 152575 2007-06-29	FIL-ESTATE GOLF v. FELICIDAD NAVARRO CARPIO, J.
Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.[6] We agree with the Court of Appeals in finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. However, we agree with petitioner that the docket fees paid were insufficient and that the clerk of court should reassess and determine the correct docket fees based on the assessed or estimated value of the subject properties for respondent to pay.
	GR NOS. 159669 - 163521 2007-03-12	UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. v. ROSEMOORE MINING TINGA, J.
The Bank adverts to the content requirement of an order denying a motion to dismiss prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The Court in Lu Ym v. Nabua[60] made a thorough discussion on the matter, to quote:Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules provides:
	GR NO. 151001 2006-09-08	DR. MELANIO MALICDEM v. ROMEO FLORES CORONA, J.
The special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss was merely interlocutory. It neither terminated nor finally disposed of the case as it still left something to be done by the court before the case was finally decided on the merits.[30] This being so, the general rule applied: the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[31]
	GR NO. 169476 2006-06-16	DOUGLAS LU YM v. ATTY. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
SO ORDERED.[8] Invoking the decision in G.R. No. 161309, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the March 16, 2005 decision of the trial court be set aside.[9] However, on May 20, 2005, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. Pertinent portion of his order denying the motion, provides: This Court received copy of above-cited Decision on March 28, 2005, after it has rendered decision in the main case on March 16, 2005. This Court has complied with the mandate of the Supreme Court to further proceed into the case and to resolve with deliberate dispatch. Only that, it has not only resolved the Motion to Dismiss but the whole case.
	GR NO. 147058 2006-03-10	DAVAO LIGHT v. JUDGE OF RTC DAVAO CITY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It has long been settled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order. It neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits, and as such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari.[16] In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] In this case, the Court finds none.
	GR NO. 152228 2005-09-23	RIMBUNAN HIJAU GROUP OF COMPANIES v. ORIENTAL WOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION
From the outset, it is worthy of note that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[37]

DOUGLAS LU YM v. GERTRUDES NABUA