This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-03-21 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| If petitioner indeed found respondents' fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents' supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention.[30] Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we ruled: Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. [Underscoring supplied.] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
CORONA, J. |
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| As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.[122] | |||||
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2007-08-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[44] Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[15] The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.[16] | |||||
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2006-02-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,[45] the Court likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city ordinance granting an exclusive franchise for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City. While professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, the ordinance was held to be beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. | |||||