This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2008-07-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[25] Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive period. | |||||
2008-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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It is well-settled that an action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been erroneously or wrongfully registered in another person's name, to its rightful or legal owner or to one who has a better right.[54] | |||||
2007-08-10 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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Well entrenched is the rule that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been erroneously or wrongfully registered in another person's name to its rightful or legal owner, or to one who has a better right.[28] | |||||
2006-10-27 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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Further, we agree with the appellate court that petitioners' complaint is barred by prescription and laches. An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[64] Even if we reckon the prescription period from TCT No. 19181 issued on November 27, 1953, the only title verified to be in the name of respondents, more than ten years have already elapsed since then until the time the petitioners filed their complaint on February 29, 1998. An action for reconveyance is imprescriptible only when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property.[65] In the present case, there is no showing that petitioners were in actual possession of the subject property. | |||||
2006-03-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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When one's property is registered in another's name without the former's consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[27] Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Meanwhile, constructive trusts are created in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[28] An action for reconveyance based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title, registration being constructive notice to all persons.[29] However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts.[30] | |||||
2006-02-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly held that an action for reconveyance does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, as in this case. Thus, in Leyson v. Bontuyan:[41] | |||||
2005-12-14 |
TINGA, J. |
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The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x x The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.[41] In any event, if FRC or any of its predecessors-in-interest had fraudulently acquired title to the subject lot, this issue should be properly ventilated in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and not in an injunction suit. By law, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.[42] In Leyson v. Bontuyan,[43] we ruled, to wit:While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Therefore, FRC's claim as a titleholder is given preference by law to any other claim of right over said land. Until such title is nullified, the Republic can raise no more than a doubtful claim over the property in question, which dubious claim militates against the issuance in its favor of a writ of injunction. So, the appellate court erred in stating the rule in reverse and in granting injunctive relief to the Republic when its claim of ownership as against FRC's is unclear. It must be stressed that injunction is not proper when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession or control of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose legal title has not clearly been established,[44] for the reason that before the question of ownership is determined, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in status quo so that no advantage may be given to one party to the detriment of the other.[45] |