Lawyerly

GR No. 172504

2013-07-31

DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK

BRION, J.

The petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. We note that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process." As discussed in Idolor v. Court of appeals,[35] it is not an ordinary suit by which one party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."[36] Being ex parte, it is a non-litigious proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard.

GR No. 183058

2013-04-03

SPS. MONTANO T. TOLOSA AND MERLINDA TOLOSA v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERSBANK

PEREZ, J.

The rule is likewise settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature.[31] As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.[32] The issuance of the writ of possession is, in turn, a ministerial function in the exercise of which trial courts are not granted any discretion.[33] Since the judge to whom the application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure,[34] it has been ruled that the ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.[35] Corollarily, any question regarding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8[36] of Act No. 3135.[37]

GR No. 199747

2013-04-03

TEODORO DARCEN v. V. R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTERPRISES

REYES, J.

The possession may be granted to the buyer either (a) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.[31] As explained in Spouses Arquiza v. CA:[32]

GR No. 192377

2012-07-25

CESAR V. MADRIAGA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

REYES, J.

A writ of possession of real property may be issued in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118.[29] Sec. 7 provides: Sec. 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under Sec. 194 of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in par. 11 of Sec. 114 of Act No. 496, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

GR No. 151911

2011-07-25

EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

MENDOZA, J.

Guided by the foregoing principles, the judgment of conviction dated November 27, 1998 penned by Justice Legaspi must be declared valid. Apparently, it was not necessary that he be a member of the Fifth Division at the time the decision was promulgated since he remained an incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan. What is important is that the ponente in a collegiate court remains a member of said court at the time his ponencia is promulgated because, at any time before that, he has the privilege of changing his opinion or making some last minute changes therein for the consideration and approval of his colleagues. After all, each division is not separate and distinct from the other divisions as they all constitute one Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges or justices.[36] Thus, when a case is filed in the Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the division or justice alone, to the exclusion of the other divisions.

GR No. 153690

2011-02-15

DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM

CARPIO MORALES, J.

On proposed Section 3(4), Commissioner Natividad asked what the effect would be of a decision that violates the proviso that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court en banc." The answer given was that such a decision would be invalid. Following up, Father Bernas asked whether the decision, if not challenged, could become final and binding at least on the parties. Romulo answered that, since such a decision would be in excess of jurisdiction, the decision on the case could be reopened anytime.[14] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

GR No. 188051

2010-11-22

ASIA UNITED BANK v. GOODLAND COMPANY

NACHURA, J.

The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature.[32] As an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any person adversely interested.[33]

GR No. 174988

2008-12-10

BANK OF PHIL IPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. HOMOBONO AND LUZDELDIA TARAMPI

CARPIO MORALES, J.

In the meantime, the Court of Appeals, to which respondents appealed the Order of Branch 105 granting the implementation of the writ of possession, dismissed the appeal, by Decision dated May 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 87902.[19] It held, among other things, that since petitioner is now the registered owner of the property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right; and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgages or their foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name, following the debtor-mortgagor-respondents' failure to redeem the mortgages, citing Idolor v. Court of Appeals.[20]

GR No. 153690

2008-08-26

DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM

NACHURA, J.

We note that the Lu Ym father and sons belatedly raised the issue of insufficient payment of docket fees in their motion for reconsideration before the CA. A perusal of the records reveals that the Lu Ym father and sons filed several pleadings before the RTC, specifically, a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift the Appointment of a Receiver, among others. They, likewise, filed several pleadings before the Court of Appeals and before this Court either as initiatory pleadings or in opposition to those filed by the adverse party. Considering their prompt action and reaction to ensure that their rights are protected, their belated objection to the payment of docket fees is, therefore, inexcusable. Well-established is the rule that after vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invoking the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, John and LLDC are barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction.[67] If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.[68] Thus, even if, indeed, the docket fees paid were inadequate, this allegation having been raised for the first time on appeal, should be disallowed.[69]

GR No. 156421

2008-04-14

JOSE FERNADEZ v. SPS. GREGORIO ESPINOZA AND JOJI GADOR-ESPINOZA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

A writ of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act No. 496[12]; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135[13] as amended by Act No. 4118.[14] The case at bar falls under the third instance.

GR No. 176533

2008-02-11

JEROME SOLCO v. CLAUDINA V. PROVIDO and MARIA TERESA P. VILLARUEL

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

Moreover, the fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no moment. Indeed, the Rules require that in case the judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor "shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff," who "shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court," who in turn shall deliver the amount to the judgment obligee or his representative in satisfaction of the judgment. However, it would be defeating the ends of justice to rigidly enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the payment made directly to the clerk of court just because it was not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty bound to "turn over all the amounts coming into his possession" to the clerk of court. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[40] Besides, payment was made not immediately after the June 7, 2005 demand of the sheriff but after the Villaruels wrote the clerk of court on August 8, 2005 requesting for the full implementation of the writ. Considering that there was no chance for Solco to deliver the payment to the respondents or their representatives, or even to the sheriff, it was only logical for him to make the payment to the clerk of court who issued the writ of execution.

GR NO. 156542

2007-06-26

CANDELARIA Q. DAYOT v. SHELL CHEMICAL COMPANY

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ filed by petitioner's predecessor, TRB, in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616, strictly speaking, is not the kind of "judicial process" contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party "sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."[28]

GR NO. 147902

2006-03-17

SPS. VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Furthermore, since the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed properties lapsed on October 1, 1999, title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated under the name of the respondent. As the owner of the properties, respondent is entitled to its possession as a matter of right.[40] The issuance of a writ of possession over the properties by the trial court is merely a ministerial function. As such, the trial court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.[41] Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.[42] Regardless of the pending suit for annulment of the certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case.[43]

	GR No. 172504 2013-07-31	DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK BRION, J.
The petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. We note that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process." As discussed in Idolor v. Court of appeals,[35] it is not an ordinary suit by which one party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."[36] Being ex parte, it is a non-litigious proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard.
	GR No. 183058 2013-04-03	SPS. MONTANO T. TOLOSA AND MERLINDA TOLOSA v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERSBANK PEREZ, J.
The rule is likewise settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature.[31] As one brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.[32] The issuance of the writ of possession is, in turn, a ministerial function in the exercise of which trial courts are not granted any discretion.[33] Since the judge to whom the application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure,[34] it has been ruled that the ministerial duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.[35] Corollarily, any question regarding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8[36] of Act No. 3135.[37]
	GR No. 199747 2013-04-03	TEODORO DARCEN v. V. R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTERPRISES REYES, J.
The possession may be granted to the buyer either (a) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing by the purchaser of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.[31] As explained in Spouses Arquiza v. CA:[32]
	GR No. 192377 2012-07-25	CESAR V. MADRIAGA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION REYES, J.
A writ of possession of real property may be issued in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118.[29] Sec. 7 provides: Sec. 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under Sec. 194 of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in par. 11 of Sec. 114 of Act No. 496, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
	GR No. 151911 2011-07-25	EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN MENDOZA, J.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the judgment of conviction dated November 27, 1998 penned by Justice Legaspi must be declared valid. Apparently, it was not necessary that he be a member of the Fifth Division at the time the decision was promulgated since he remained an incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan. What is important is that the ponente in a collegiate court remains a member of said court at the time his ponencia is promulgated because, at any time before that, he has the privilege of changing his opinion or making some last minute changes therein for the consideration and approval of his colleagues. After all, each division is not separate and distinct from the other divisions as they all constitute one Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges or justices.[36] Thus, when a case is filed in the Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the division or justice alone, to the exclusion of the other divisions.
	GR No. 153690 2011-02-15	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM CARPIO MORALES, J.
On proposed Section 3(4), Commissioner Natividad asked what the effect would be of a decision that violates the proviso that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court en banc." The answer given was that such a decision would be invalid. Following up, Father Bernas asked whether the decision, if not challenged, could become final and binding at least on the parties. Romulo answered that, since such a decision would be in excess of jurisdiction, the decision on the case could be reopened anytime.[14] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
	GR No. 188051 2010-11-22	ASIA UNITED BANK v. GOODLAND COMPANY NACHURA, J.
The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature.[32] As an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any person adversely interested.[33]
	GR No. 174988 2008-12-10	BANK OF PHIL IPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. HOMOBONO AND LUZDELDIA TARAMPI CARPIO MORALES, J.
In the meantime, the Court of Appeals, to which respondents appealed the Order of Branch 105 granting the implementation of the writ of possession, dismissed the appeal, by Decision dated May 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 87902.[19] It held, among other things, that since petitioner is now the registered owner of the property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right; and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgages or their foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name, following the debtor-mortgagor-respondents' failure to redeem the mortgages, citing Idolor v. Court of Appeals.[20]
	GR No. 153690 2008-08-26	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM NACHURA, J.
We note that the Lu Ym father and sons belatedly raised the issue of insufficient payment of docket fees in their motion for reconsideration before the CA. A perusal of the records reveals that the Lu Ym father and sons filed several pleadings before the RTC, specifically, a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift the Appointment of a Receiver, among others. They, likewise, filed several pleadings before the Court of Appeals and before this Court either as initiatory pleadings or in opposition to those filed by the adverse party. Considering their prompt action and reaction to ensure that their rights are protected, their belated objection to the payment of docket fees is, therefore, inexcusable. Well-established is the rule that after vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invoking the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, John and LLDC are barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction.[67] If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.[68] Thus, even if, indeed, the docket fees paid were inadequate, this allegation having been raised for the first time on appeal, should be disallowed.[69]
	GR No. 156421 2008-04-14	JOSE FERNADEZ v. SPS. GREGORIO ESPINOZA AND JOJI GADOR-ESPINOZA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A writ of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act No. 496[12]; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135[13] as amended by Act No. 4118.[14] The case at bar falls under the third instance.
	GR No. 176533 2008-02-11	JEROME SOLCO v. CLAUDINA V. PROVIDO and MARIA TERESA P. VILLARUEL YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Moreover, the fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no moment. Indeed, the Rules require that in case the judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor "shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff," who "shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court," who in turn shall deliver the amount to the judgment obligee or his representative in satisfaction of the judgment. However, it would be defeating the ends of justice to rigidly enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the payment made directly to the clerk of court just because it was not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty bound to "turn over all the amounts coming into his possession" to the clerk of court. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[40] Besides, payment was made not immediately after the June 7, 2005 demand of the sheriff but after the Villaruels wrote the clerk of court on August 8, 2005 requesting for the full implementation of the writ. Considering that there was no chance for Solco to deliver the payment to the respondents or their representatives, or even to the sheriff, it was only logical for him to make the payment to the clerk of court who issued the writ of execution.
	GR NO. 156542 2007-06-26	CANDELARIA Q. DAYOT v. SHELL CHEMICAL COMPANY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ filed by petitioner's predecessor, TRB, in LRC CAD. REC. NOS. 1 and 9616, strictly speaking, is not the kind of "judicial process" contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party "sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."[28]
	GR NO. 147902 2006-03-17	SPS. VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Furthermore, since the one-year period to redeem the foreclosed properties lapsed on October 1, 1999, title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated under the name of the respondent. As the owner of the properties, respondent is entitled to its possession as a matter of right.[40] The issuance of a writ of possession over the properties by the trial court is merely a ministerial function. As such, the trial court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.[41] Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.[42] Regardless of the pending suit for annulment of the certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case.[43]

TERESITA V. IDOLOR v. CA