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RUDIGARIO C. GATMAITAN v. DR. RICARDO B. GONZALES

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 199338 2013-01-21	ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Neither can the grant of an early retirement package to Lusan show that Padillo was unfairly discriminated upon. Records show that the same was merely an isolated incident and petitioners have failed to show that any bad faith or motive attended such disparate treatment between Lusan and Padillo. Irrefragably also, there is no showing that other Bank employees were accorded the same benefits as that of Lusan which thereby dilutes the soundness of petitioners' imputation of discrimination and bad faith. Verily, it is axiomatic that bad faith can never be presumed it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.[38] This petitioners were unable to prove in the case at bar.
	GR No. 168987 2012-10-17	PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. FRANCISCO LAO LIM PERALTA, J.
As to the award of exemplary damages in favor of respondent Go, Gatmaitan vs. Gonzales,[13] is instructive, to wit: x x x Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 167563 2010-03-22	COLLEGE OF IMMACULATE CONCEPTION v. NLRC PERALTA, J.
Aside from the fact that this Court is not the proper forum to consider the merits of petitioner's charge of fraud and graft and corruption against the LA and the respondent, petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of the LA's official duties[19] in rendering his decision. Petitioner was not able to show clear and convincing proof to establish partiality, fraud and acts constituting graft and corruption. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that the law bestows upon a public official the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions.[20]The Court held that: x x x public respondents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which petitioners failed to rebut when they did not present evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith. Bad faith can never be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. x x x[21]
	GR No. 176127 2009-01-30	RODOMIEL J. DOMINGO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN KATHRYN JOY B. PAGUIO TINGA, J.
While generally this Court may not review the factual findings of the Ombudsman, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,[21] we take exception in this case as the findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22]
	GR No. 168906 2008-12-04	PERLA S. ESGUERRA v. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The records do not show that Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill will or malicious intent when she did not grant the TRO and preliminary injunction Esguerra prayed for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.[29] It is not presumed and the party who alleges the same has the onus of proving it.[30] Esguerra has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended the actions of Judge Asdala.
	GR No. 99398 2001-01-26	CHESTER BABST v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Consequently, on January 17, 1983, BPI, as successor-in-interest of CBTC, instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, a complaint[13] for sum of money against ELISCON, MULTI and Babst, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 49226.
	GR No. 99398 2001-01-26	CHESTER BABST v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
"the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), for a time, had proposed a formula for the settlement of Eliscon's past obligations to its creditors, including the plaintiff [BPI], but the formula was expressly rejected by the plaintiff as not acceptable (long before the filing of the complaint at bar)."[36] The Court of Appeals held that even if the account officer who attended the June 1981 creditors' meeting had expressed consent to the assumption by DBP of ELISCON's debts, such consent would not bind BPI for lack of a specific authority therefor. In its petition, ELISCON counters that the mere presence of the account officer at the meeting necessarily meant that he was authorized to represent BPI in that creditors' meeting. Moreover, BPI did not object to the substitution of debtors, although it objected to the payment formula submitted by DBP.