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PEOPLE v. JUDGE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR Nos. 153304-05 2012-02-07	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN BRION, J.
A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal.[23] Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.[24]
	GR No. 151258 2012-02-01	ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE SERENO, J.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
	GR No. 187728 2011-09-12	CHURCHILLE V. MARI v. ROLANDO L. GONZALES PERALTA, J.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v. Hernandez,[21] the Court held that "delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."[22] The trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer of venue.
	GR No. 173319 2009-12-04	FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES v. DANILO A. BUEMIO CARPIO MORALES, J.
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How,[23] the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. This was reiterated in People v. Hernandez,[24] viz: The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In 1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." The law provided for time limits in order "to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court." On August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98, the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
	GR No. 186001 2009-10-02	ANTONIO CABADOR v. PEOPLE ABAD, J.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy trial.[14] This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.[15] This was the main thrust of Cabador's motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
	GR No. 162370 2009-04-21	DAVID TIU v. CA CARPIO, J.
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea;[22] and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.[23] Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."[24] Further, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case.[25]