This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-07-31 |
BRION, J. |
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| P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[22] This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.[23] | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan[9] teaches:[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed - homicide/murder and arson. (emphasis and underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied) Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, "Amending the Law on Arson," reads: | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus: Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the `interrogation' made by the latter - admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x. | |||||
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2010-03-09 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.[30] Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.[31] | |||||
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2008-07-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We also reiterate the well-settled rule that this Court accords great weight and a high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in the present case. Here, the RTC was unequivocally upheld by the CA, which was clothed with the power to review whether the trial court's conclusions were in accord with the facts and the relevant laws.[32] The credibility given by the trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on, because of the trial courts' unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels.[33] | |||||
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2008-05-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Note that the last paragraph of Art. 172 does not specify that the offending person is a public or private individual as does its par. 1. Note also that the last paragraph of Art. 172 alludes to the use of the false document embraced in par. 2 of Art. 171 where it was made to appear that "persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact participate." Patently, even a public officer may be convicted under Art. 172. The crime in Art. 171 is absorbed by the last paragraph of Art. 172. Thus, Pactolin's argument about being deprived of his right to be informed of the charges against him when the Sandiganbayan convicted him as a private person under Art. 172, is baseless. The headings in italics of the two articles are not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[5] The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or the preamble of the information or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[6] In this case, the Amended Information encompasses the acts of Pactolin constitutive of a violation of Art. 172 in relation to par. 2 of Art. 171 of the RPC. | |||||
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2008-03-28 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.[28] An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v. Malngan.[29] Said the Court in Malngan:The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of? As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is | |||||