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HONDA PHILS. v. SAMAHAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA HONDA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 200746 2014-08-06	BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP v. BENSON INDUSTRIES PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
When the obligation to pay separation benefits, however, is not sourced from law (particularly, Article 297 of the Labor Code), but from contract,[23] such as an existing collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees, an examination of the latter's provisions becomes necessary in order to determine the governing parameters for the said obligation. To reiterate, an employer which closes shop due to serious business losses is exempt from paying separation benefits under Article 297 of the Labor Code for the reason that the said provision explicitly requires the same only when the closure is not due to serious business losses; conversely, the obligation is maintained when the employer's closure is not due to serious business losses. For a similar exemption to obtain against a contract, such as a CBA, the tenor of the parties' agreement ought to be similar to the law's tenor. When the parties, however, agree to deviate therefrom, and unqualifiedly covenant the payment of separation benefits irrespective of the employer's financial position, then the obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms should be carried out to its full effect. Verily, it is fundamental that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and thus should be complied with in good faith;[24] and parties are bound by the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they have agreed to, the only limitation being that these stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy.[25] Hence, if the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.[26] As enunciated in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:[27]
	GR No. 192601 2013-06-03	PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS v. JOURNAL EMPLOYEES UNION BERSAMIN, J.
The nature and force of a CBA are delineated in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda,[20] thuswise: A collective bargaining agreement (or CBA) refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. Accordingly, the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions of the CBA, being the law between the parties, must be complied with by them.[21] The literal meaning of the stipulations of the CBA, as with every other contract, control if they are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties.[22]
	GR No. 176985 2013-04-01	RICARDO E. VERGARA v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES PERALTA, J.
This case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule that only questions of law are proper in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[13] Certainly, it is not Our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again, particularly where the findings of both the CA and the NLRC coincide.
	GR No. 181531 2009-07-31	NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR CARPIO MORALES, J.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.[7]
	GR No. 163942 2008-11-11	NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
Furthermore, this Court, not being a trier of facts, finds no reason to alter or disturb the NLRC findings on this matter, these findings being based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA.[22] Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[23] Likewise, we are not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arrived at arbitrarily and/or bereft of any rational basis.[24]
	GR No. 151309 2008-10-15	BISIG MANGGAGAWA SA TRYCO v. NLRC NACHURA, J.
We have no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[16] This is particularly true when the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA are in absolute agreement.[17] In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA uniformly agreed that the petitioners were not constructively dismissed and that the transfer orders did not amount to an unfair labor practice. But if only to disabuse the minds of the petitioners who have persistently pursued this case on the mistaken belief that the labor tribunals and the appellate court committed grievous errors, this Court will go over the issues raised in this petition.
	GR No. 163419 2008-02-13	TSPIC CORPORATION v. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION VELASCO JR., J.
A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. [17] Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.[18] However, sometimes, as in this case, though the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the parties sometimes arrive at conflicting interpretations. Here, TSPIC wants to credit the increase granted by WO No. 8 to the increase granted under the CBA. According to TSPIC, it is specifically provided in the CBA that "the salary/wage increase for the year 2001 shall be deemed inclusive of the mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders that may be issued after Wage Order No. 7." The Union, on the other hand, insists that the "crediting" provision of the CBA finds no application in the present case, since at the time WO No. 8 was issued, the probationary employees (second group) were not yet covered by the CBA, particularly by its crediting provision.