This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2011-05-30 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| In civil cases, the party who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, that even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment. In other words, the debtor bears the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.[42] | |||||
|
2010-11-15 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single official receipt to prove payment.[25] This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a receipt, which is a written and signed acknowledgment that money and goods have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not exclusive.[26] All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo,[27] a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,[28] and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking account with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only serve as documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not enough to prove payment. | |||||
|
2010-04-19 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| We do not agree. Respondents presented a declaration[19] made under oath by Leopoldo Utlang, Jr., assistant supervisor of the hacienda, attesting that petitioners were asked to return to do some work for the hacienda but refused to do so upon the advice of their lawyer. Interestingly too, as late as November of 2001 or even after almost three months from the filing of the illegal dismissal case, the names of Literal and Basay were still listed and included in respondents' payroll as can be gleaned in the Master Voucher covering the employees' payroll of November 12 to 16, 2001. While a voucher does not necessarily prove payment, it is an acceptable documentary record of a business transaction.[20] As such, entries made therein, being entered in the ordinary or regular course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity.[21] Hence, on the basis of this material proof evincing respondents' intention to retain petitioners as employees, we are not convinced that petitioners were told to stop working or were prevented from working in the hacienda. This may well be an indication of respondents' lack of intention to dismiss petitioners from employment since they were still considered employees as of that time. Records are likewise bereft of any showing that to date, respondents had already terminated petitioners from employment. | |||||
|
2009-09-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Petitioner failed to show that Zamora Street, the place where the subject property is situated, was identified as APD/ULRZ by Proclamation No. 1967. Except for his allegation ― which respondent refutes ― that the property is within the area for priority development zone,[29] petitioner presented no concrete proof to substantiate said claim. The law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.[30] There being no showing that the property being leased by petitioner is located within any of the APD/ULRZ, the right not to be dispossessed and the right of first refusal could not have accrued in petitioner's favor. | |||||
|
2009-07-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences, thus, avoiding litigation, or put an end to one already commenced.[18] As a contract, when the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged intention of the parties; the terms are to be understood literally, just as they appear on the face of the contract.[19] Considering that Caruff never intended to transfer the subject property to PMO, burdened by the generating set and sump pumps, respondent should remove them from the subject property. | |||||
|
2008-06-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. - Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where it is the plaintiff (complainant herein) who alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.[11] | |||||
|
2008-04-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| In Alonzo v. San Juan,[16] we held that the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed to be the best evidence of the fact of payment. | |||||
|
2005-09-23 |
|||||
| While the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in a complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied,[47] no similar provision was incorporated relative to motions to dismiss. Rightly so, since a motion to dismiss is not an initiatory pleading as opposed to a complaint. Thus, the general rule that whoever alleges a fact must prove that fact by convincing evidence[48] is applicable in this case. | |||||
|
2005-05-26 |
PUNO, J. |
||||
| In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it.[5] This evidentiary rule is based on the principle that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove it.[6] | |||||