This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2013-04-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.[12] x x x (Emphasis Ours.) | |||||
|
2010-02-26 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| We also cannot accept petitioner's theory that Director Manalo's initial endorsement of the case to the NLRC served as a dismissal of the case, which prevented her from subsequently assuming jurisdiction over the same. The said endorsement was evidently not meant as a final disposition of the case; it was a mere referral to another agency, the NLRC, on the mistaken belief that jurisdiction was lodged with the latter. It cannot preclude the regional director from subsequently deciding the case after the mistake was rectified and the case was returned to her by the DOLE Secretary, particularly since it was a labor case where procedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest of substantial justice.[19] | |||||
|
2008-07-04 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Parenthetically, this Court in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil[23] and Pamplona Plantation Company v. Acosta[24] had pierced the veil of corporate fiction and declared that the two corporations,[25] PPLC and the herein respondent, are one and the same. | |||||
|
2007-09-13 |
AZCUNA, J. |
||||
| Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari to this Court.[25] It is a well-entrenched rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions are accorded by this Court high respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the appellate court. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court of having been able to observe, at close range, the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses as they testified.[26] Furthermore, it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[27] | |||||
|
2006-12-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| On this score, the Court adopts the findings in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil,[8] which involves the same petitioner in this case and some of its workers. In that case, petitioner contended that the case should have been dismissed because of the respondents' failure to implead the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation, Inc. as an indispensable party, since as admitted in their respective affidavits, it was their true and real employer. The Court, however, rejected petitioner's contention and concluded that by piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the two corporations the Pamplona Plantation Corporation, Inc. and the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation are one and the same. Thus, the Court ruled:An examination of the facts reveals that, for both the coconut plantation and the golf course, there is only one management which the laborers deal with regarding their work. A portion of the plantation (also called Hacienda Pamplona) had actually been converted into a golf course and other recreational facilities. The weekly payrolls issued by petitioner-company bore the name "Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc." It is also a fact that respondents all received their pay from the same person, Petitioner Bondoc -- the managing director of the company. Since the workers were working for a firm known as Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc., the reason they sued their employer through that name was natural and understandable. | |||||