This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[36] Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.[37] | |||||
|
2008-03-31 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| In essence, [the dissenting opinion] avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On the contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v. Mojica. Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[28] | |||||