Lawyerly

GR No. 207105

2015-11-10

BERSAMIN, J.

In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[41] the Court has expounded on the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 thusly: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running.[30] Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.[31]

GR No. 192803

2013-12-10

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group in the ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, we said in Cayat v. Commission on Elections[62] that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of the voters.

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible[22] should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.[23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.[28] The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.[29]

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[51] should not apply to him because Ramon's disqualification became final prior to the elections.[52] Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[53] where the Court said: x x x [I]n Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

In Miranda v. Abaya,[48] the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda's CoC. The Court explained: The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.[11] Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.[12] At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.[13]

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,[21] Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon's COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006[22] applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:[36]

GR No. 195229

2012-10-09

EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,[34] petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa's third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa's opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s| as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa's certificate of candidacy for violation of the three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc's denial of Latasa's motion for reconsideration.

GR No. 188671

2010-02-24

MOZART P. PANLAQUI v. COMELEC

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Hence, the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec for not regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final judgment of disqualification against Velasco prior to the elections, so as to fall within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on Elections[5] on the exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.

GR No. 184935

2009-12-21

DESEDERIO O. MONREAL v. COMELEC

ABAD, J.

on the rejection of the second placer that triggers the rule on succession, does not apply to his case since the COMELEC has already disqualified Foronda and annulled his proclamation. But that doctrine applies to this case, since the COMELEC ordained Foronda's disqualification only after the elections had taken place.[6] On October 29, 2007, the election day, Foronda was still legally a candidate.[7] It is

GR No. 170908

2007-08-24

NESTOR SAN JUAN v. COMELEC

QUISUMBING, J.

In Cayat v. COMELEC,[15] this Court upheld the Order of the COMELEC First Division denying reconsideration of its Resolution of April 12, 2004 canceling Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat's certificate of candidacy for failure of the movant to pay the prescribed filing fees when he filed his motion for reconsideration. This Court held that the failure to pay the filing fees made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all. In the same manner, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division in according the same treatment to herein petitioner's belatedly filed Motion for Reconsideration.

	GR No. 207105 2015-11-10	ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[41] the Court has expounded on the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 thusly: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running.[30] Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.[31]
	GR No. 192803 2013-12-10	ALLIANCE FOR RURAL v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group in the ballot but such group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, we said in Cayat v. Commission on Elections[62] that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of the voters.
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible[22] should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.[23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.[28] The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.[29]
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[51] should not apply to him because Ramon's disqualification became final prior to the elections.[52] Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,[53] where the Court said: x x x [I]n Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
In Miranda v. Abaya,[48] the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda's CoC. The Court explained: The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.[11] Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.[12] At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.[13]
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,[21] Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon's COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006[22] applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:[36]
	GR No. 195229 2012-10-09	EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,[34] petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa's third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa's opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s\| as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa's certificate of candidacy for violation of the three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc's denial of Latasa's motion for reconsideration.
	GR No. 188671 2010-02-24	MOZART P. PANLAQUI v. COMELEC CARPIO MORALES, J.
Hence, the present petition which imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec for not regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final judgment of disqualification against Velasco prior to the elections, so as to fall within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission on Elections[5] on the exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.
	GR No. 184935 2009-12-21	DESEDERIO O. MONREAL v. COMELEC ABAD, J.
on the rejection of the second placer that triggers the rule on succession, does not apply to his case since the COMELEC has already disqualified Foronda and annulled his proclamation. But that doctrine applies to this case, since the COMELEC ordained Foronda's disqualification only after the elections had taken place.[6] On October 29, 2007, the election day, Foronda was still legally a candidate.[7] It is
	GR No. 170908 2007-08-24	NESTOR SAN JUAN v. COMELEC QUISUMBING, J.
In Cayat v. COMELEC,[15] this Court upheld the Order of the COMELEC First Division denying reconsideration of its Resolution of April 12, 2004 canceling Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat's certificate of candidacy for failure of the movant to pay the prescribed filing fees when he filed his motion for reconsideration. This Court held that the failure to pay the filing fees made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all. In the same manner, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division in according the same treatment to herein petitioner's belatedly filed Motion for Reconsideration.

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT v. COMELEC