This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2009-11-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Verily, the action of the Ombudsman in provisionally dismissing the complaint for violation of Section 3(e), without prejudice to its re-opening upon final resolution of DARAB Case No. 0040, is not whimsical or arbitrary. Such action finds support in the Court's rulings that a trial court, or in this case a quasi-judicial tribunal, has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases by holding in abeyance the proceedings before it in the exercise of its sound discretion to await the outcome of another case pending in another court or body, especially where the parties and the issues are the same. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action (in this case, the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) before the Ombudsman) cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action (DARAB Case No. 0040) are settled, the second action should be stayed.[20] | |||||
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2009-02-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants. But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, [17] or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled. [18] Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary exercise of the court's discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari. | |||||
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2007-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In sum, while there have been instances where suspension of proceedings was effectively obtained in pending cases which technically were not criminal and civil in nature, such action was based on the court's discretionary power to stay proceedings. A judicial order issued pursuant to the court's discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes grave abuse of discretion,[39] a trace of which is wanting herein. | |||||