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JOSE LUIS ROS v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 153810 2015-08-12	WINSTON R. GARCIA v. ANGELITA TOLENTINO JARDELEZA, J.
First. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a remedy within the administrative machinery must be resorted to give the administrative officer every opportunity to decide a matter that comes within his jurisdiction. Such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.[55] Thus, under this doctrine, Tolentino et al. should have first brought the dispute regarding the validity of a circular implementing the GSIS Law to the GSIS Board (and not the courts) for resolution as required by law. Contrary to what Tolentino et al. assert, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[56]
	GR No. 171101 2011-07-05	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
That these converted lands were declared as a Special Economic Zone by then President Ramos (Luisita Industrial Park II) only emphasizes the desirability and economy of using them as industrial lands. Before they may be used for other purposes, reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the process of conversion; [313] the DAR's approval of the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial estate is a condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. [314] A proposed ecozone cannot be considered for presidential proclamation, unless the landowner first submits to PEZA a land-use conversion clearance certificate from the DAR. [315]
	GR No. 179844 2011-03-23	EMERSON B. BAGONGAHASA v. JOHANNA L. ROMUALDEZ NACHURA, J.
However, this Court refuses to rule on the validity of the CARP coverage of the subject properties and the issuance of the assailed CLOAs. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[21] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[22] The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance of a notice of coverage - an ALI case - being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.[23] The power to determine such issue lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
	GR No. 183409 2010-06-18	CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM PEREZ, J.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform,[39] this Court has enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion.[40] It bears stressing that the said date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoningof agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority.[41] It necessarily follows that any reclassification made thereafter can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority. Having recognized the DAR's conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
	GR No. 164340 2008-11-28	OTILIA STA. ANA v. SPS. LEON G. CARPO AND AURORA CARPO NACHURA, J.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[34]
	GR No. 168787 2008-09-03	DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. POLO COCONUT PLANTATION CO. CORONA, J.
In Ros v. DAR,[23] we held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the process of conversion in the DAR[24] before they may be used for other purposes.[25] Since the DAR never approved the conversion of the Polo estate from agricultural to another use, the land was never placed beyond the scope of the CARP.