This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-12-03 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Case law explains that "[a] remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency."[54] In this relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper "when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x and x x x in case of urgency."[55] | |||||
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2011-08-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The answer is in the negative. That the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before coming to this Court did not preclude treating her petition as one for certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The allegations of the petition definitely placed the petitioner's recourse under most, if not all, of the exceptions. | |||||
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2011-08-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court held that in computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. | |||||